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LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GENDER CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of World War II, faced with the spread of Stalinist
communism into Central and Eastern Europe,' the Council of Europe
promulgated the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)' in 1950; the Council then
established the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1958 to apply and
interpret the Convention.' The United Kingdom signed the European
Convention on November 4, 1950, and ratified it on March 8, 195 1.4 The
Convention entered into force in the United Kingdom on September 3, 1953.'
Or did it?
The reality is that this international convention is not binding on the
sovereign United Kingdom in the same sense that the U.S. Constitution is
binding on the United States. The Convention provides two procedures for
holding member states accountable by the ECHR. There is a procedure for a
petition by an individual under Article 25 and an interstate procedure under
Article 24.6 Nevertheless, in 1984, Jochen Frowein, Vice President of the
European Commission of Human Rights, referred to the European Convention
as "a sleeping beauty, frequently referred to but without much impact."7 As
stated succinctly almost twenty years later: "The [ECHR] can award only
money judgments and has no equity jurisdiction. The ECHR has no enforce-
ment authority, and relies on member states to observe their [Council of
Europe] treaty obligation to be bound by the judgments of the ECHR."8
D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1995).
2 Id. Many abbreviations and acronyms are used for this Convention, including "ECHR"
for European Convention on Human Rights. See, e.g., David Bonner et al., JudicialApproaches
to the Human Rights Act, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549 (2003). Unfortunately, this acronym is
often used for the European Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Nicholas G. Karambelas,
Fundamentals of the European Union Court System, WASH. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 37, 39. In this
Article, "ECHR" will refer to the Court, not the Convention.
3 MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS LAW 65 (1995).
' Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms CETS No.: 005, http://conventions.coe.intltreaty/CommunlChercheSig.asp?NT=005&
CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
5 Id.
6 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
7 Jochen Abr. Frowein, European Integration Through Fundamental Rights, 18 U. MicH.
J.L. REFoRM 5, 8 (1984).
s Karambelas, supra note 2, at 39.
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Rather, the European Convention is structured to place primary responsibil-
ity for its enforcement on the signatory states themselves.' Article 1 provides,
"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention."
10
Further, Article 13 requires each member state to provide "an effective remedy
before a national authority" for redressing violations of the Convention."
However, for decades the prevailing view within the legal system of the
United Kingdom was that the European Convention was not-to use an
American constitutional law concept-incorporated into the law of the United
Kingdom. This view was succinctly expressed by Lord Bridge in a 1991
decision:
It is accepted, of course, by the applicants that, like any other
treaty obligations which have not been embodied in the law by
statute, the Convention is not part of the domestic law, that the
courts accordingly have no power to enforce Convention rights
directly and that, if domestic legislation conflicts with the
Convention, the courts must nevertheless enforce it. 2
Seven years later, the United Kingdom took the next step and enacted a law
to apply the European Convention within the United Kingdom and make
"protection of human rights primarily the responsibility of the UK courts"; 13
that law is the Human Rights Act 1998. The Human Rights Act 1998 became
effective on October 2, 2000, just over a half century after the United Kingdom
signed the European Convention and thereby made the Convention part of
British law.'" As stated by a prominent British academic, the Convention
became "internally binding" in the United Kingdom in October 2000 by virtue
of the Human Rights Act 1998.15
9 HENRY*J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLrICS, MORALS 797 (2d ed. 2000).
10 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 [hereinafter European
Convention].
"Id. art. 13,213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
12 Exparte Brind, 1 A.C. 696,747 (P.C. 1991).
13 HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 295-96 (Rambert de Mello ed., 2000).
14 Andrew Bainham, Exciting Times in England-Human Rights, Children and Divorce,
INT'L FAM. L., July 2001, at 71, 71.
"5 Nigel Lowe, New International Conventions Affecting the Law Relating to Children-A
Cause for Concern?, INT'LFAM, L., Nov. 2001, at 171, 171.
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Key provisions of the European Convention relate directly or indirectly to
matters of great concern to family law. Article 8 protects the right to respect
for private and family life.' 6 Article 12 guarantees the right to marry 17 and
Article 14 is a prohibition against discrimination. 8
Thus enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 clearly had the potential to
effect significant changes in British family law.'9 How extensive those
changes would be, and how quickly they would be effectuated, could not be
known in 1998. Britain is still at the early stages of implementation, and the
process of making British domestic law "compatible" with the European
Convention is a significantly different process than constitutional adjudication
in the United States. 20
Nevertheless, two decisions of the ECHR in 2002,2" effectively reversing
several earlier cases,22 have compelled a reexamination of British law as it
relates to the status of transsexual persons. The Law Lords of the House of
Lords have determined that the longstanding British law that one's gender 3 at
birth remains immutable, 24 is "incompatible" with the European Convention.
25
This confluence of legal mandates-the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR
decisions in 2002, and the Law Lords' decision in 2003-have led directly to
16 European Convention, supra note 10, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
'7 Id. art. 12, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
18 Id. art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
19 In the context of this Article, "British family law" does not generally include Scottish
family law, which varies in significant ways from the family law of the rest of Great Britain.
20 See generally Gerda Kleijkamp, Comparing the Application and Interpretation of the
United States Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 307 (2002).
2' Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002); 1. v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 967 (2002).
22 Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986); Cossey v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1990); X, Y and Z v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1997); Sheffield and Horsham v. United
Kingdom, App. Nos. 22885/93, 23390/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163 (1998).
23 There is much dispute as to whether the proper legal term is "gender" or "sex." This
Article generally uses "gender" unless the context appears to demand otherwise.
24 Corbett v. Corbett, [ 1970]2 All E.R. 33, 47 (P.); Regina v. Tan, [1983] 2 All E.R. 12, 19
(C.A.); Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2002] 1 All E.R. 311,333 (C.A. 2001), affd, [2003] 2 All E.R.
593 (H.L.).
2' Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] 2 All E.R. 593, 605 (H.L.).
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the enactment of the Gender Recognition Act 2004,26 which comprehensively
addresses the legal status of transsexual persons in the United Kingdom.
This Article will examine the history of the legal treatment of transsexual
persons in the United Kingdom and by the ECHR. It will look at the process
of moving British law in this area from incompatibility to compatibility with
the European Convention and examine the provisions of the Gender Recogni-
tion Act. It will draw comparisons with the evolving, unsatisfactory, and
inconsistent American law on the subject. Finally, this Article will argue that
the hypertechnical chromosomal approach to gender identification is as
misplaced for transsexual persons as it is largely irrelevant for the vast
majority of people who do not suffer from gender dysphoria or gender identity
disorder.
11. BACKGROUND: TRANSSEXUALISM
There is a large body of literature on the nature of transsexualism from
various points of view, including biological, psychological, and legal
perspectives, with no uniformity of opinion regarding etiology or conse-
quences.27 The study of transsexualism continues to evolve,28 as do the
medical techniques for surgical intervention when such intervention is
indicated.29 The most recent jurisprudential description of transsexualism in
the United Kingdom comes from the lead House of Lords decision in Bellinger
v. Bellinger in 2003:
26 Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c.7 (Eng.), available at http://www. legislation.hmso.gov.
uk/acts/acts2004/20040007.htm.
27 See, e.g., BRYANTULLY, ACCOUNTINGFORTRANSSEXUALISM ANDTRANSHOMOSEXUAUTy
xiii (2002) (arguing against the "imposition of psychiatric syndromes on gender dysphoric
phenomena"); Kurt Schapira et al., The Assessment and Management of Transsexual Problems,
22 BRIT. J. HosP. MED. 63 (1979) (explaining the medical management viewpoint of
transsexualism and arguing that a purely medical approach to the issue is inadequate); Douglas
K. Smith, Transsexualism, Sex, Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 963
(1971) (discussing transsexualism from biological perspective).
28 See CHRISTINE BURNS ET AL, RECOGNISING THE IDENTITY AND RIGHTS OFTRANSSEXUAL
AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A REPORT FOR THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL
WORKING GROUPON TRANSSEXUALISSUES (1999), available at http://www.pfc.org.uk/workgrp/
pfcrptl.htm; see also Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent
Jurisprudence of Transsexualism", 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275,276 (1997).
29 See Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 22885/93, 23390/94, 27 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 163, 192 (1998).
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The indicia of human sex or gender (for present purposes the
two terms are interchangeable) can be listed, in no particular
order, as follows. (1) Chromosomes: XY pattern in males, XX
in females. (2) Gonads: testes in males, ovaries in females. (3)
Internal sex organs other than the gonads: for instance, sperm
ducts in males, uterus in females. (4) External genitalia. (5)
Hormonal patterns and secondary sexual characteristics, such as
facial hair and body shape: no one suggests these criteria should
be a primary factor in assigning sex. (6) Style of upbringing and
living. (7) Self-perception....
In the vast majority of cases these indicia in an individual all
point in the same direction. There is no difficulty in assigning
male or female gender to the individual. But nature does not
draw straight lines. Some people have the misfortune to be born
with physiological characteristics which deviate from the normal
in one or more respects, and to lesser or greater extent. These
people attract the convenient shorthand description of inter-
sexual....
Transsexual people are to be distinguished from inter-sexual
people. Transsexual is the label given, not altogether happily, to
a person who has the misfortune to be born with physical
characteristics which are congruent but whose self-belief is
incongruent. Transsexual people are born with the anatomy of a
person of one sex but with an unshakeable belief or feeling that
they are persons of the opposite sex. They experience themselves
as being of the opposite sex.... The aetiology of this condition
remains uncertain. It is now generally recognised as a psychiatric
disorder, often known as gender dysphoria or gender identity
disorder. It can result in acute psychological distress.3"
Ell. EARLY U.K. DECISIONS ON TRANSSEXUALISM
A. Marital Status: Corbett (1970)
The first reported opinion in Great Britain on the gender of a post-operative
transsexual person for purposes of marriage was the 1970 opinion of the High
30 Bellinger, [2003] 2 All E.R. at 597.
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Court by Judge Ormrod in Corbett v. Corbett,3 which set a mold that has yet
to be broken by the British courts. The story of the short-lived marriage of
Arthur Cameron Corbett and April Ashley is not a happy one. The parties
were in general agreement concerning the primary facts. The husband,
Corbett, was married when he met Ashley in November 1960.32 Ashley had
been born George Jamieson in 1935.33 As early as 1956, Jamieson began
taking the female hormone oestrogen34 and appearing with a troupe of female
impersonators using the stage names "Toni/April. '35 In May 1960, in
",36Casablanca, Jamieson underwent a "sex-change operation.As described by Judge Ormrod, the surgery
consisted in the amputation of the testicles and most of the
scrotum, and the construction of a so-called 'artificial vagina', by
making an opening in front of the anus, and turning in the skin of
the penis after removing the muscle and other tissues from it, to
form a pouch or cavity occupying approximately the position of
the vagina in a female, that is between the bladder and the
rectum. Parts of the scrotum were used to produce an approxima-
tion in appearance to female external genitalia.37
There was no dispute that at the time he met Ashley, Corbett was aware that
Ashley had been born a male and had subsequently undergone a "sex-change
operation."3 There followed a tumultuous on-again, off-again relationship
between Corbett and Ashley over the next three years.39 During that time,
Corbett procured a divorce from his wife, and Ashley obtained a woman's
insurance card from the Ministry of National Insurance.' Ashley was not able,
however, to persuade the superintendent registrar to change her birth
certificate.41 On September 10, 1963, Corbett and Ashley had a hastily
31 Corbett v. Corbett, (1970] 2 All E.R. 33 (P.).
32 Id. at 37-39.
33 id. at 35.
34 This Article uses the British spelling of "estrogen" when discussing the British cases.
'5 See Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. at 36.
36 Id.
37 Id.
'8 Id. at 37.
'9 Id. at 37-38.
40 Id. at 38-39.
41 Id. at 38.
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arranged wedding ceremony in Gibralter.42 The parties agreed that they had
not engaged in "sexual activity in a physical sense" prior to their wedding.43
The Corbett-Ashley nuptials are a prime example of the old adage, "Marry
in haste, repent at leisure." Between the date of the wedding and the end of
their relationship in early December 1963, "[tlhey had been together no more
than 14 days in all."44 There were, in fact, more days of court hearings than
days of marital cohabitation, and the litigation was not resolved until February
1970, over six years after the wedding ceremony.45 Further, there was a factual
dispute between the parties as to whether the marriage had been consummated
and, if not, who was at fault.
46
In May 1967, Corbett filed suit against Ashley47 seeking in the first instance
a declaration that their marriage was "null and void and of no effect" because
at the time of the ceremony Ashley was male.48 In the alternative, Corbett
sought a decree of nullity on the grounds of Ashley's alleged "incapacity or
wilful refusal" to consummate the marriage.49
The trial lasted from mid-November 1969 through February 2, 1970, with
expert testimony from nine doctors.5 The primary focus was on whether
Ashley was legally a male or female for purposes of marriage in September
1963 when she married Corbett.51
Two medical inspectors examined Ashley and reported:
We find that the breasts are well developed though the nipples
are of masculine type. The voice is rather low pitched. There are
almost no penile remains and there is a normally placed urethral
orifice. The vagina is of ample size to admit a normal and erect
penis. The walls are skin covered and moist. There is no
impediment on "her part" to sexual intercourse. Rectal examina-
tion does not reveal any uterus or ovaries or testicles.... We
42 Id. at 39.
41 Id. at 38.
44 Id. at 39.
45 See id. at 33.
46 See id. at 39.
47 Id. at 40. Ashley had attempted to sue Corbett for maintenance in February 1966, but that
action did not proceed because of service problems. Id.
48 Id. at 34.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 33, 35.
" See id. at 35.
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also strongly suggest that an investigation into "her" chromo-
somal sex be carried out by some expert .... 52
A subsequent chromosomal examination showed Ashley to have XY (i.e.,
male) chromosomes. Judge Ormrod thus concluded that Ashley "is correctly
described as a male transsexual, possibly with some comparatively minor
physical abnormality. 54
Judge Ormrod noted that there are several criteria for assessing "the sexual
condition" of an individual:
All the medical witnesses accept that there are, at least, four
criteria for assessing the sexual condition of an individual. These
are-
(i) Chromosomal factors.
(ii) Gonadal factors (presence or absence of testes or ovaries).
(iii) Genital factors (including internal sex organs).
(iv) Psychological factors.
Some of the witnesses would add-
(v) Hormonal factors or secondary sexual characteristics (such as
distribution of hair, breast development, physique etc which
are thought to reflect the balance between the male and
female sex hormones in the body).55
However, while the court found these medical criteria relevant, the court
cautioned that the criteria "do not necessarily decide[ ] the legal basis of sex
determination. 56 Parsing the issue even more finely, Judge Ormrod dis-
avowed the notion that he was determining Ashley's" 'legal sex' . . . at large,"
but rather asserted that he was only determining "what is meant by the word
'woman' in the context of a marriage. 57
Judge Ormrod reasoned that the critical issue was Ashley's sex at the time
of marriage, rather than her gender, because
52 Id. at 41.
" Id. at 46.
54 Id. at 44.
55 Id.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 48.
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sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called
marriage, because it is and always has been recognised as the
union of man and woman. It is the institution on which the
family is built, and in which the capacity for natural heterosexual
intercourse is an essential element. It has, of course, many other
characteristics, of which companionship and mutual support is an
important one, but the characteristics which distinguish it from
all other relationships can only be met by two persons of opposite
sex.
58
Using language which resonates in the current debate over same-sex
marriage, and which is certain to infuriate many, Judge Ormrod concluded:
Having regard to the essentially heterosexual character of the
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria must, in my
judgment, be biological, for even the most extreme degree of
transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance
which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads
and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally
capable of performing the essential role of a woman in
marriage.59
Exactly what the learned judge meant by "the essential role of a woman in
marriage" was left unexplained. However, based on his conclusion that Ashley
could not perform that essential role, Judge Ormrod pronounced "the so-called
marriage of 10th September 1963" to be void.' One cannot help but wonder
whether Judge Ormrod believed that Ashley could perform the essential role
of a man in marriage, whatever that role might be.
Although it was unnecessary for the court to address the secondary issue of
incapacity or wilful refusal to consummate the marriage, it briefly did. Judge
Ormrod found Corbett's version of events (that his advances had been refused)
more plausible than Ashley's (that there had been some penetration). 6'
Ultimately, Judge Ormrod held that the credibility of the parties did not matter
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 49.
61 Id.
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because, in his judgment, a male-to-female transsexual is simply not physically
capable of consummating a marriage with a male. He explained:
In any event, however, I would, if necessary, be prepared to hold
that the respondent was physically incapable of consummating a
marriage because I do not think that sexual intercourse, using the
completely artificial cavity constructed by [the surgeon] can
possibly be described ... as 'ordinary and complete intercourse'
or as 'vera copula--of the natural sort of coitus'.... When such
a cavity has been constructed in a male, the difference between
sexual intercourse using it, and anal or intra-crural intercourse is,
in my judgment, to be measured in centimetres.62
Finding estoppel to be inapplicable,63 Judge Ormrod granted Corbett a
decree of nullity, declaring that the marriage was void ab initio. 4
B. Expanding Corbett Beyond Matrimonial Law: Tan (1983)
In a series of decisions over the next thirty-plus years, British courts have
continuously adhered to the views of Judge Ormrod in Corbett. Indeed, in
1983, the British judiciary expanded the Corbett rationale by applying it
outside of its stated scope of determining legal sex solely for the purposes of
entering into heterosexual marriage. In Regina v. Tan, three persons were
criminally prosecuted for various sexual offences 65 arising out of the operation
of two "disorderly houses. ''66 Gloria Greaves was convicted of violating
section 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956,67 which provides: "It is an offence
for a man knowingly to live wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution.""8
Like April Ashley, Gloria Greaves had been born a male, but "had undergone
both hormone and surgical treatment, consisting in what are called 'sex change
operations', consisting essentially in the removal of the external male organs
and the creation of an artificial vaginal pocket."69 Further, Brian Greaves was
61 Id. at 49.
63 Id. at 50.
64 Id. at 51.
65 This Articles uses the British spelling of "offences" in discussing this case.
' Regina v. Tan, [1983] 2 All E.R. 12, 14 (C.A.).
67 id.
61 Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 30 (Eng.).
69 Tan, [1983] 2 All E.R. at 19.
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convicted of living on the earnings of male prostitution in violation of section
5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967, based on the earnings of Gloria Greaves.7 °
On appeal, the Court of Appeal recognized that Gloria Greaves' s status as
a male was an essential ingredient of the offences asserted against Gloria and
Brian Greaves. 7' Additionally, the court acknowledged that Corbett was
limited to defining the sex of a post-operative transsexual for purposes of
marriage.7' The appellants argued that the Corbett rationale should not apply
in the context of the two sexual offences acts if the individual "had become
philosophically or psychologically or socially female."73
The Court of Appeal summarily disposed of this argument in one relatively
brief paragraph:
We reject this submission without hesitation. In our judgment,
both common sense and the desirability of certainty and consis-
tency demand that the decision in Corbett v Corbett should apply
for the purpose, not only of marriage, but also for a charge under
§ 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 or § 5 of the Sexual
Offences Act 1967. The same test would apply also if a man had
indulged in buggery with another biological man. That the
Corbett v Corbett decision would apply in such a case was
accepted on behalf of the appellant. It would, in our view, create
an unacceptable situation if the law were such that a marriage
between Gloria Greaves and another man was a nullity, on the
ground that Gloria Greaves was a man; that buggery to which she
consented with such other person was not an offence for the same
reason; but that Gloria Greaves could live on the earnings of a
female prostitute without offending against § 30 of the 1956 Act
because for that purpose he/she was not a man and that the like
position would arise in the case of someone charged with living
on his earnings as a male prostitute.74
Thus, notwithstanding Judge Ormrod's apparent effort to speak only to the
essentials of marriage in Corbett, his analysis was applied beyond the realm
70 Id. at 14.
71 Id. at 19.
72 id.
73 id.
74 Id.
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of civil law into the criminal realm in the name of "common sense ... certainty
and consistency."75 Even in a world in which marriage is generally limited to
being between two persons of the opposite sex, can it truly be asserted that the
supposed reasons for nullifying a marriage between a male and a male-to-
female transsexual person have equal force in determining the sex or gender
of a prostitute or one who profits from prostitution? It is certainly true that for
whatever-probably myriad-reasons, Corbett and Ashley were unable to
fulfill each other's aspirations of marital bliss. However, unquestionably,
Corbett knew that Ashley had been born male and, if it had been an issue for
Corbett, he presumably realized that Ashley could not have borne him
children.76
Clearly, even if Brian Greaves knew that Gloria Greaves was born a male,77
there is no reason to believe that Gloria's customers shared this knowledge.
There is no such suggestion in the case, and furthermore, the advertisements
for Gloria's services referred to a "lovely tan coloured mistress," the "most
equipped mistress in Town," and "madam."7" Hence, one can only surmise
that customers sought and obtained rather specialized services from a person
whom they believed to be female. Based on the nature of the advertised
services, it is highly doubtful that they expected-or desired-Gloria to bear
them children. The fact that Gloria was born male thus appears to have been
utterly irrelevant to the criminal enterprise in which Gloria and Brian were
engaged.
IV. CHALLENGING THE UNITED KINGDOM'S TREATMENT OF
TRANSSEXUALS IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Legal Recognition of Sex Change: Rees (1987)
Overlapping the Tan case chronologically, was the inevitable claim by a
female-to-male transsexual asserting that Britain's refusal to recognize him
75 Id.
76 Could the bearing of children be the undefined "essential role of a woman in marriage"
alluded to by Judge Ormrod? If so, there surely are many female wives who are disinclined or
unable for various reasons to perform that "essential role." Likewise, there surely are many male
husbands similarly disinclined or unable to engage in procreation. Yet, as a general rule, the law
does not deem their marriages null and void.
7' The relationship between Brian and Gloria Greaves is not explained in the reported
decision.
78 Tan, [1983] 2 All E.R. at 15.
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legally as a male was a violation of the European Convention. The claim
resulted in the first decision of the ECHR on the subject, Rees v. United
Kingdom, in 1986. 79
Mark Nicholas Alban Rees was bom a female in 1942 and named Brenda
Margaret Rees.8" Brenda had the physical and biological characteristics of a
female child, and accordingly was recorded in the register of births as a
female.8' From "a tender age," Brenda "started to exhibit masculine behavior
and was ambiguous in appearance. 82 In 1970, Brenda began hormone
treatments and started to develop secondary male characteristics.83 In 1971,
Brenda obtained a name change to Brendan Mark Rees.' In May 1974,
Brendan underweht surgical treatment for "physical sexual conversion," with
a bilateral mastectomy.85 The cost of Rees's surgeries was borne by the
National Health Service.86 In 1977, Rees changed his name to Mark Nicholas
Alban Rees.87 He requested and received a new British passport in that name.88
From 1973 onwards, Rees made several unsuccessful efforts to get private
bills through Parliament to recognize his sex as male and to obtain the issuance
of a new birth certificate showing his sex as male. 9 In 1980, through his
solicitor, Rees made a formal request to the Registrar General to change his
registration from female to male under section 29(3) of the Births and Deaths
Registration Act 1953, on the ground that there had been "a mistake in
completing the Register."' He supported this request with a medical affidavit
to the effect that a person's psychological sex is the most important criterion
of sex and is predetermined at birth.9 ' The Registrar General refused the
request because " 'in the absence of any medical report on the other agreed
criteria (chromosomal sex, gonadal sex and apparent sex),' he was 'unable to
consider whether an error (had been) made at birth registration in that the child
9 Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986).
8 Id. at 57.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 id.
94 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 57-58.
87 Id. at 57.
88 Id.
89 ld. at 58.
9 Id.
91 Id.
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was not of the sex recorded.' "92 Except for his birth certificate, all of Rees's
documents eventually showed him to be male.93 The prefix "Mr." was added
to his passport in 1984.94
Rees lodged an application in 1979 with the European Commission on
Human Rights complaining that U.K. law did not confer on him the legal status
corresponding to his actual condition. 95 He asserted violations of Articles 3,
8, and 12 of the European Convention. 96 In 1984, the Commission declared the
complaints "admissible" under Articles 8 and 12 (but not under Article 3).97
In a report later in 1984, the Commission expressed the unanimous opinion
that there had been a breach of Article 8, but not of Article 12.98 As the United
Kingdom did not accept the Commission's report, there followed a hearing
commencing in March 1986 before the ECHR.99 The ECHR devoted most of
its analysis to the claimed breach of Article 8," which states, "Everyone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspon-
dence."'
The gravamen of Rees's complaint was based on the refusal of the United
Kingdom to classify him legally as a male and to issue him a new birth
certificate showing that classification.'12 Whenever he was in a situation
where he was required to produce his birth certificate, doing so caused him
"embarrassment and humiliation."' 3
Initially the ECHR noted that "although the essential object of Article 8 is
to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities,
there may in addition be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect
for private life." More importantly, the ECHR observed that any such positive
obligations are subject to the State's "margin of appreciation. '' 4 The ECHR
opined that the refusal to issue a new birth certificate cannot be considered an
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 id.
9' Id. at 62.
96 ld.
97 Id. Article 3 prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.
European Convention, supra note 10, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
98 Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 62.
" Id.
100 Id. at 62-68.
'Ol European Convention, supra note 10, art. 8, § 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
102 Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 63.
103 Id.
104 id.
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"interference"'' 5 hence the issue was whether the United Kingdom had a
"positive obligation" to do so, subject to its "margin of appreciation."'0 6 As
the ECHR had previously explained in its Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom
judgment in 1985:
However, especially as far as those positive obligations are
concerned, the notion of 'respect' [for family life] is not clear
cut: having regard to the diversity of the practices followed and
the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion's
requirements will vary considerably from case to case. Accord-
ingly, this is an area in which the Contracting Parties enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken
to ensure compliance with the Convention with due regard to the
needs and resources of the community and of individuals.'0 7
Moreover, the ECHR noted that there was significant disparity among
member States in addressing the issue. Several states allowed "transsexuals
the option of changing their personal status to fit their newly-gained identity,"
but not in a uniform manner.108 Other states had no such option.' Because
there existed "little common ground between the Contracting States in this area
and.., the law appears to be in a transitional stage," the ECHR deemed that
Contracting Parties enjoy a "wide margin of appreciation."". °
The ECHR recognized that "[i]n determining whether or not a positive
obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck
between the general interest of the community and the interests of the
individual.""' The United Kingdom would not recognize Rees as a man for
all social purposes; rather he would be regarded as a woman as far as marriage
(per Corbett), pension rights, and certain employment purposes." 2 The
105 Id.
106 id.
107 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81,
9472/81, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, 497 (1985).
108 Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 63-64.
109 Id. at 64.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 65.
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existence of the unamended birth certificate would also prevent him from
entering into certain types of private agreements as a man. 113
Nevertheless, balancing the interests of the community against Rees's
interests, the ECHR found no positive obligation on the part of the United
Kingdom under Article 8 to establish a new type of birth documentation
showing, and constituting proof of, current civil status," 4
The ECHR also rejected a narrower interpretation of Rees's complaint, in
which he sought an incidental adjustment in the form of an annotation to the
present birth register."' The United Kingdom conceded that it makes such
annotations, for example, in the case of a subsequent adoption." 6 The United
Kingdom argued that the requested annotation would mislead the public in the
absence of an error or omission at the time of birth." 7 The ECHR noted that
if such a change were recorded, it could not mean that the individual had
acquired all of the biological characteristics of the new sex." 8 In any event,
the fact of the annotation would still reveal the change of sexual identity,
unless it were kept secret, which would fundamentally modify the United
Kingdom's system for recording births.' Given the United Kingdom's wide
margin of appreciation in this area, there was no violation of Article 8 despite
the fact that the United Kingdom cooperated in Rees's medical treatment. 120
The ECHR sounded a significant cautionary note, however. Although there
was no breach of Article 8 in the present case, that was no guarantee for the
future. The ECHR stated, "That being so, it mustfor the time being be left to
the respondent State to determine to what extent it can meet the remaining
demands of transsexuals."'' In other words, the ECHR's conclusion was not
written in stone. To the contrary, "[tihe Convention has always to be
interpreted and applied in the light of current circumstances. The need for
appropriate legal measures should therefore be kept under review having
regard particularly to scientific and societal developments."' 122
113 Id.
1"4 Id. at 66-68.
115 Id. at 65-66.
116 Id. at 66.
"117 Id.
'" Id. at 67.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (emphasis added).
122 Id. at 67-68 (footnote omitted).
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The ECHR quickly dispatched Rees's assertion that the United Kingdom
violated his right to marry under Article 12 of the European Convention. It
viewed Article 12 as referring to "the traditional marriage between persons of
opposite biological sex."' 23 Indeed, Article 12 contains the explicit limitation
that "[mien and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right."' 24 While those national laws cannot restrict or reduce the right to marry
in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired,
the United Kingdom's restriction on transsexuals marrying persons of their
original sex cannot be said to have such an effect.
25
While the ECHR unanimously found no violation of Article 12, the right
to marry, three of fifteen judges dissented from the finding of no violation of
Article 8, the right to respect for private life. 126 The dissenting judges would
have found that the United Kingdom could readily have allowed an annotation
in the birth register to the effect that there had been a change in Mr. Rees's
sexual identity and that it could be possible for him to obtain a short birth
certificate indicating only his new sexual identity.'27 Neither of these changes,
in the dissenting judges' view, would have entailed a change in the British
system of recording civil status. 21
B. Rees Revisited: Cossey (1990)
Only three years after the Rees decision, the ECHR was once again
confronted with a claim by a British transsexual that the United Kingdom's
policies violated Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention. Barry
Kenneth Cossey was born in 1954 and registered in the birth register as a
male. 29 As a teenager, Cossey "understood that, although she had male
external genitalia, she was psychologically of the female sex."'"3 In 1972,
Cossey assumed the first name of Caroline, which she confirmed by "deed
poll" in 1973.131 A deed poll is enrolled in the Central Office of the Supreme
123 Id. at 68.
124 European Convention, supra note 10, art. 12, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
125 Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 68.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 69.
128 Id. at 70.
129 Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, 624 (1990).
130 Id.
131 id.
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Court, and a new name thus enrolled is valid for purposes of legal identifica-
tion and may be used for a variety of purposes such as the issuance of a
passport and registration on the electoral roll. 132 In 1974, having already had
hormone treatments, Cossey underwent gender reassignment surgery in
London.'33 According to the ECHR, "[a]s a post-operative female transsexual,
she is able to have sexual intercourse with a man.,
'134
In 1976, the United Kingdom issued Cossey a passport as a female.
135
Cossey subsequently had a successful career as a fashion model.
3 6
In 1983, Cossey and an Italian man wished to marry, but the registrar
general informed Cossey that such a marriage would be void under English
law. 37  In early 1984, Cossey lodged an application with the European
Commission on Human Rights asserting that the United Kingdom was
violating her rights under Article 8 of the European Convention, the right to
respect for private and family life. 3 8 She additionally invoked Article 12, the
right to marry. 139 Interestingly, Cossey married another man in 1989, but that
marriage was pronounced void by the English High Court less than a year
later."'
As described by the ECHR, there had been no real change of law or
practice in the United Kingdom since the decision in the Rees case. The
National Health Service carried out gender reassignment treatments, and adults
generally were allowed to obtain new, legal names which could be used on a
driver's license or passport. 4' Nevertheless, the United Kingdom would not
change or annotate an entry in a birth register for a post-operative transsexual
absent medical evidence of an initial error; nor would it issue a new birth
2 Id. at 625.
I3 d. at 624.
134 Id. This finding appears to directly contradict Judge Ormrod's conclusion in Corbett that
such intercourse is, at least, a legal impossibility.
135 Id.
136 Id. Indeed, so successful was Cossey's sexual transformation that she appeared as a"Bond
girl" in the James Bond movie, For Your Eyes Only and on the cover of Playboy magazine. See
Well Known TS: Caroline Cossey (TULA) Model, Activist, at http://www.angelfire.com/ak/
mysketchbook/famous.htmi (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
137 Cossey, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 624-25.
138 Id. at 629.
t39 id.
'40 Id. at 625.
,41 Id. at 625-26.
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certificate. 14 2 A post-operative transsexual, moreover, could not legally marry
a person of her original sex.'43
The European Commission on Human Rights found Cossey's application
admissible and concluded that the United Kingdom was in violation of Article
12 of European Convention, but not Article 8."" The case was referred to the
ECHR by the United Kingdom, and the ECHR, in a decision issued in 1990,
found no violation of the Convention.14
5
Cossey tried to distinguish her case from Rees on two grounds: (1) unlike
Rees she had a partner of her original sex wishing to marry her and (2) she was
socially accepted in her new sex." 6 The ECHR found neither of these
distinctions material, nor did it find material the fact that Cossey was a male-
to-female transsexual whereas Rees was a female-to-male transsexual.'47
Therefore, the issue became whether the ECHR should depart from its
judgment in Rees. 18 While the ECHR is not bound by its previous judgments,
it will usually follow them unless there are cogent reasons for not doing so,
such as to ensure that the interpretation of the European Convention reflects
societal changes and remains in line with present-day conditions. 149
Despite Cossey' s assertions, the ECHR continued to believe that the failure
of the United Kingdom to alter the register of births or to issue her a new birth
certificate could not be considered an "interference."'' 0 Rather, the issue
remained whether the United Kingdom had a "positive obligation" to do these
things. 5 ' The ECHR noted that there had been no significant scientific
developments since Rees and that gender reassignment surgery still did not
result in the acquisition of all the biological characteristics of the other sex. 52
While there had been "certain developments" in the law of some of the
member States of the Council of Europe (COE), there still was a diversity of
practice on the issue; thus Contracting States still enjoyed a wide margin of
appreciation. 3 Accordingly, it could not "at present be said that a departure
142 Id. at 626-28.
141 Id. at 628.
'" Id. at 629.
141 Id. at 622, 629.
146 Id. at 638.
141 Id. at 638-39.
141 Id. at 639.
149 id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 641.
153 Id.
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from the Court's earlier decision is warranted in order to ensure that the
interpretation of Article 8 on the point at issue remains in line with present day
conditions."' 54
Turning briefly to Article 12, the right to marry, the ECHR again relied on
Rees. 1" It noted that any inability on Cossey's part to marry a woman did not
stem from any legal impediment 56 (although it is difficult to discern how she
might have consummated such a marriage). Nor was her legal inability to
marry a man out of conformity with Article 12: "attachment to the traditional
concept of marriage provides sufficient reason for the continued adoption of
biological criteria for determining a person's sex for the purpose of marriage,
this being a matter encompassed within the power of the Contracting States to
regulate by national law the exercise of the right to marry." '157
In addition to the already cited caveat in Cossey that the United Kingdom
was not atpresent in violation of the Convention, there were two other signals
in Cossey that should have given the United Kingdom cause for concern. In
Rees, only a few years earlier, the vote by the ECHR finding no violation of
Article 12 was unanimous;' in Cossey, the vote on that issue was fourteen to
four.'59 Also, in Rees, the vote finding no violation of Article 8 was twelve to
three;"6 in Cossey, it was ten to eight.
161
A number of dissenting opinions were filed in Cossey,162 two of them
particularly noteworthy. Judge Martens argued that if a transsexual is to
achieve any degree of well-being, after treatment, "the new sexual identity
which he has thus acquired must be recognised not only socially but also
legally."' 163 The transsexual's "rebirth" can only be completed when his newly
acquired sexual identity is fully and in all respects recognized by law. 16 The
refusal of the United Kingdom to do so did indeed, in Judge Martens's view,
constitute an interference with Cossey's rights under Article 8.165 According
to Judge Martens, the ECHR should have so held and then let the United
" Id. (emphasis added).
... Id. at 642.
156 Id.
I' Id. at 642-43.
as See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
9 Cossey, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643.
'~ See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
161 Cossey, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643.
162 Id. at 643-65.
163 Id. at 645.
6 id.
165 Id. at 651.
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Kingdom deal with the technical issues, rather than have itself been drawn into
those issues.' 66 As to the right to marry under Article 12, Judge Martens
pointed out some of the difficulties with Judge Ormrod's opinion in Corbett:
he noted that it certainly would not be permissible for a member State to limit
marriage to persons who can prove an ability to procreate." 7 Since only the
chromosomal factor is incapable of being changed, Judge Martens asked why
this factor should be made decisive.' A male-to-female transsexual is capable
of intercourse with a male and, moreover, "marriage is far more than a union
which legitimates sexual intercourse and aims at procreating."' 69 To the Judge
Martens, the effect of the United Kingdom's rule was to reduce the post-
operative transsexual's right to marry to such an extent that the very essence
of the right was impaired.17 Although there had been no scientific develop-
ments since Rees, there had been societal developments. 7 ' Whereas the
ECHR in Rees had assumed that only five member States made it possible for
post-operative transsexuals to have their new sexual identity fully recognized
by the law, Judge Martens found that fourteen member States had made some
such provision at the time that Cossey was being decided.1
7 1
A much shorter dissenting opinion of Judges Palm, Foighel, and Pekkanen
echoed several of Judge Martens's points and then cut to the heart of the
matter:
The only argument left against allowing Miss Cossey to marry a
man is the fact that biologically she is considered not to be a
woman. But neither is she a man, after the medical treatment and
surgery. She falls somewhere between the sexes. In this
situation a choice must be made and the only humane solution is
to respect the objective fact that, after the surgical and medical
treatment which Miss Cossey has undergone and which was
based on her firm conviction that she is a woman, Miss Cossey
is psychologically and physically a member of the female sex and
socially accepted as such."'
161 Id. at 654.
167 Id. at 656-57.
168 Id. at 657.
'69 Id. at 658.
170 Id. at 659.
171 id. at 660.
172 Id. at 661.
171 Id. at 665.
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C. Attempting to Side-Step Rees and Cossey: X, Y and Z (1997)
In the mid-1990s, three British citizens brought to the ECHR another
challenge to the United Kingdom's treatment of post-operative transsexuals in
family law, but without directly attacking the marriage prohibition as in Rees
and Cossey. This third unsuccessful challenge culminated in the ECHR's
decision in X, YandZv. United Kingdom in 1997.' 4
"X," a female to male transsexual, was born in 1955 and works as a college
lecturer in Manchester, England. 71 Since 1979, he has lived with "Y," a
woman born in 1959, whom he could not marry under British law. 76 "Z" was
a child born in 1992 to Y as a result of artificial insemination by donor
(AD).177
After an initial refusal, a hospital ethics committee had agreed to provide
the AID treatment. 7 8 They asked X to acknowledge himself as the father
within the meaning of Britain's Human Fertility and Embryology Act 1990.179
Y was impregnated with sperm from an anonymous donor, and Z was born as
a result.' Prior to Z's birth, X had enquired of the registrar general whether
he could be listed as the father of Y's child.' The Registrar General
ultimately decided that only a biological man could be regarded as a father for
the purposes of registration."' As a registered female at birth, X could not be
considered a biological man under U.K. law. When Z was born, X and Y were
114 X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1997).
17s Id. at 146-47. N.B. Stephen Whittle, Senior Lecturer in Law at Manchester Metropolitan
University, a female-to-male transsexual and co-founder of Press for Change, a U.K. lobbying
group for Transsexual Rights, was born in May 1955. He and his long-time partner, Sarah
Rutherford, have children through artificial insemination by donor. He has actively campaigned
for full legal rights for transsexual people. See, e.g., FTM International, Our
History-Biographies, http://www.ftmi.org/Hist/Bios/whittle.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005);
Press for Change, 1997 News, News, http://www.pfc.org.uk/news/1997/etgrice 1.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2005); Press for Change, Campaigners, http://www.pfc.org.uklcampaign/people/
swhittle.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). The conclusion seems inescapable that Dr. Whittle is
"X." Nevertheless, in this Article I shall continue to use the initials given to the applicants as
reported in the Court's decision.
176 Id. at 147.
177 id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
1&o Id.
181 Id.
182 id.
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not allowed to register X as the father, and that part of the register was left
blank. 83 Z was, however, given X's surname on the register.'"
Under the Human Fertility and Embryology Act 1990, where an unmarried
woman gives birth as a result of AID with the involvement of her male partner,
the partner (not the sperm donor) is treated for legal purposes as the father of
the child.'85
Additionally, under U.K. law, "parental responsibility" (i.e., all the rights
and duties of a parent) automatically vests in the mother and, if she is married,
in her husband. 86 A father who was not married to the mother at the time of
a child' s birth may apply for a court order granting him parental responsibility,
or he may attain it by a written agreement in a prescribed form with the
mother.'87 Parental responsibility cannot vest in any other person unless a
"residence order" in respect of the child is made in his or her favor.'88 Such
an order settles the arrangements to be made as to the person with whom the
child is to live.1 9 Where a court makes a residence order in respect of any
person who is not the parent or guardian of a child, that person is automatically
vested with "parental responsibility" for the child, as long as the residence
order remains in force.'" Thus, although X, being a non-father, could not
directly apply for parental responsibility of Z, he could have jointly applied
with Y for a joint residence order which would have had the effect of giving
him parental responsibility, but only while it remained in force.' 9 '
X, Y, and Z asserted that the lack of recognition of X as Z' s father denied
them respect for their family and private life in contravention of Article 8 of
the European Convention. 92 They further asserted that the resulting position
in which they were placed was discriminatory in violation of Articles 8 and 14
(a non-discrimination provision) taken together.'93
In 1994, the Commission declared the complaints admissible under Articles
8 and 14.194 In a report in 1995, the Commission concluded that there had been
' Id. at 148.
184 id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 149.
187 id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 150.
193 id.
194 Id.
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a violation of Article 8 and that it was unnecessary to reach the Article 14
issue.195
Before the ECHR, the United Kingdom argued that the concept of "family
life" did not apply to the relationships between X and Y, or X and Z. 196 The
United Kingdom asserted that X and Y should be viewed as two women living
together since X was still legally a female. 97 The government conceded,
however, that it would be difficult to maintain that there was no family life if
X and Y applied for and received a joint residence order for Z. 98 However,
inasmuch as X had undergone gender reassignment surgery and had lived with
Y in all appearances as her male partner since 1979, as they had jointly applied
for and had been granted treatment for AID, as X had been involved through-
out the AID process, and as X had acted as Z's father throughout her life, the
ECHR readily concluded that "de facto family ties link the three applicants."' 99
The applicants maintained that there had been significant societal
developments since the ECHR's decision in Rees: first, the European
Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had
called for the recognition of transsexual identity; second, the Court of Justice
of the European Communities had decided that dismissal of a transsexual for
a reason related to gender reassignment was illegal discrimination; and third,
recent research suggested that transsexuality has a physiological basis in the
structure of the brain.2 ' The applicants argued that these developments
undercut the reasoning in Rees and Cossey, and that the ECHR should now
hold that the notion of respect for family life and/or private life required States
to recognize the present sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals for legal
purposes.2°1
However, the applicants also argued that their claims were different from
those in Rees and Cossey, that X was not trying to amend his birth certificate
but rather to be named Z's father on her birth certificate. 202 Further, they
asserted that the State's margin of appreciation should be narrower on this
issue because of the interests of the child in having her social father recognized
19s id.
'9 Id. at 166.
197 id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 id. at 167.
201 id.
202 Id.
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as her legal father." 3 The United Kingdom, of course, argued for a wide
margin of appreciation because of the complex issues involved and because
there was not yet a broad consensus on these issues among the member
States.2"
The ECHR found the issues presented to be distinguishable from those in
Rees and Cossey. °5 It recognized that it had previously held that where the
existence of a family tie with a child has been established, the State must act
in a manner calculated to enable that tie to be developed and legal safeguards
must be established that render possible, from the moment of birth or as soon
as practicable thereafter, the child's integration into the family.206 All of its
prior cases on these issues related to family ties between biological parents and
their children, however. 207 The ECHR noted that there was no common
European standard as to the granting of parental rights to transsexuals, nor as
to the manner in which the societal relationship between a child conceived by
AID and the person who performs the role of father should be reflected in
law.2"8 Given the lack of common ground, the ECHR concluded that the
United Kingdom was entitled to a wide margin of appreciation. 209
Against that wide margin of appreciation, the ECHR deemed that the
applicants' concerns could be largely obviated by the simple expedient of X
and Y jointly applying for a residence order.210 Similarly, concerns about Z
not being able to inherit from X though intestacy could be overcome by X
making out a will.
21
'
The ECHR felt that the United Kingdom was justified in being cautious: it
was concerned that there would be an inconsistency in the law if X were
allowed to be listed as Z's father on her birth certificate but was still legally a
female.21 2 This was the obvious "Achilles' heel" in X arguing that it was not
necessary to overrule Rees and Cossey in order to grant him relief in this case.
Given the complexities of the issues, the lack of uniformity among the
Contracting States and the United Kingdom's resultant wide margin of
203 id.
204 Id. at 167-68.
205 Id. at 168.
206 Id. at 168-69.
207 Id. at 169.
208 id.
209 id.
210 Id. at 171.
211 Id. at 170-71.
212 Id. at 170.
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appreciation, the ECHR concluded that the fact that U.K. law did not allow
special legal recognition of the relationship between X and Z does not amount
to a failure to respect family life within the meaning of Article 8.213 The vote
on this issue was fourteen to six. 14
The ECHR briefly disposed of the Article 14 discrimination issue,
concluding that it was tantamount to a restatement of the Article 8 complaint
and raised no separate issue.215 That vote was seventeen to three.216
D. A Fourth Unsuccessful Challenge: Sheffield and Horsham (1998)
Only a year after the X, Y and Z decision, two new applicants came before
the ECHR, asserting that the United Kingdom's treatment of transsexuals
violated their rights under the European Convention and resulting in the
ECHR's July 1998 opinion in Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom.21 7
Miss Kristina Sheffield, a British citizen and London resident, was born in
1946 and registered as a male.21 8 Prior to gender reassignment surgery,
Sheffield married a woman and had one child by that marriage.219 In 1986,
Sheffield began treatment for gender identity disorder.220 Interestingly,
Sheffield was advised by the psychiatrist and surgeon that she was required to
get a divorce as a precondition to gender reassignment surgery.22' She did
so.222 Sheffield eventually underwent the surgery. 23 She changed her name
by deed poll to Kristina Sheffield, and obtained a driver's license and passport
in that name.224
Subsequent to the divorce, Sheffield's former spouse obtained a court order
to terminate Sheffield's contact with their daughter on the basis that contact
with a transsexual was contrary to the child's interests; as of the date of the
213 Id. at 171-72.
214 Id. at 172.
215 Id.
216 id.
211 Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 22885/93,23390/94,27 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 163 (1998).
211 Id. at 167.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 168.
221 Id.
222 id.
223 Id.
224 id.
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decision, Sheffield had not seen the child in twelve years.225 Sheffield's birth
certificate and various governmental records continued to record her original
name and gender.226 She had, she claimed, suffered public humiliation and
discrimination as a result of the United Kingdom's official records continuing
to show her as a male and, hence, as a transsexual.227
Miss Rachel Horsham, a British citizen and Dutch resident, was born in the
United Kingdom in 1946 and registered at birth as a male.228 By the age of
twenty-one, Horsham realized she was a transsexual.229 She left the United
Kingdom in 1971 and led her life abroad as a female.230 She underwent gender
reassignment surgery in Amsterdam in 1992.231 Although she obtained an
order from a Dutch court that she be issued a new birth certificate by the
Registrar of Births in The Hague, recording her new name and the fact that she
was of the female sex, the United Kingdom refused to amend her original birth
certificate.232 She wished to marry her male partner and live with him in the
United Kingdom, but could not do so, as the United Kingdom would not
consider her to be validly married even if the marriage was valid where entered
into.233
The European Commission on Human Rights found in both cases a
violation of Article 8, respect for the applicants' private lives.234 In both cases,
the Commission found that neither Article 12 nor Article 14 gave rise to a
separate issue and that there was no violation of Article 13235
Once again, as in Rees and Cossey, the ECHR defined the issue as being
whether the United Kingdom had failed to comply with a "positive obligation"
to ensure respect for the applicants' rights to respect for their private lives.236
The ECHR found that the essence of each applicant's claim was the continued
insistence of the United Kingdom on the determination of gender according to
225 Id. The Supreme Court of Nevada has upheld termination of a natural father's parental
rights under similar circumstances. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986).
226 Sheffield and Horsham, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 168.
227 Id. at 168-69.
221 Id. at 169.
229 Id.
230 id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 ld. at 169-70.
234 Id. at 172-73.
235 id.
236 Id. at 190.
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biological criteria alone and the immutability of gender information once it is
correctly entered on the birth register.
2 37
The ECHR found no noteworthy legal development since the Cossey
decision despite its own decision in a case brought by a transsexual against
France where it had found that France had violated the applicant's right to
respect for private life; it distinguished that case based on the French legal
system's civil status system.238 Despite submissions by the amicus group
Liberty, regarding legal developments in Europe, the ECHR still found a lack
of a common approach to gender classification of transsexuals.2 39 Similarly the
ECHR found no definitive developments in the area of medical science to
settle conclusively the doubts concerning the causes of transsexualism. 20 The
ECHR also found significant that "it still remains established that gender
reassignment surgery does not result in the acquisition of all the biological
characteristics of the other sex despite the increased scientific advances in the
handling of gender reassignment procedures."2 ''
Based on these findings, the ECHR, by a vote of eleven to nine, found no
violations of the applicants' Article 8 rights to respect for their private lives.
24 2
Rather, the failure of the United Kingdom to legally recognize their new
gender had not given rise to detriment of sufficient seriousness as to override
the United Kingdom's margin of appreciation in this area. 43
Nevertheless, the majority issued a strongly worded caution:
Having reached those conclusions, the Court cannot but note that
despite its statements in the Rees and Cossey cases on the
importance of keeping the need for appropriate legal measures in
this area under review having regard in particular to scientific
and societal developments, it would appear that the respondent
State has not taken any steps to do so. The fact that a transsexual
is able to record his or her new sexual identity on a driving
licence or passport or to change a first name are not innovative
237 Id. at 191.
238 Id. at 177, 192 (distinguishing B. v. France, App. No. 13343/87, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1
(1992)). In B., the ECHR noted a variety of ways in which "the lot of transsexuals could be seen
to be much harder in France than in England." B., 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 29-34.
239 Sheffield and Horsham, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 192-93.
240 Id. at 192.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 197.
243 Id. at 193.
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facilities. They obtained even at the time of the Rees case. Even
if there have been no significant scientific developments since the
date of the Cossey judgment which make it possible to reach a
firm conclusion on the aetiology of transsexualism, it is neverthe-
less the case that there is an increased social acceptance of
transsexualism and an increased recognition of the problems
which post-operative transsexuals encounter. Even if it finds no
breach of Article 8 in this case, the Court reiterates that this area
needs to be kept under review by Contracting States.2"'
By a vote of eighteen to two, and with a very short analysis, the ECHR found
no violation of Article 12, the right to marry.245 With an equally short analysis,
the ECHR unanimously found no violation of Article 14, the prohibition of
discrimination.2"
V. ADOPTION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
On November 9, 1998, Her Royal Highness Elizabeth H gave royal assent
to the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).247 Although the bill that became the
HRA had been presented for its first reading in the House of Lords in October
1997,24 enactment of the HRA was the culmination of a political effort going
back over decades.249 There had been a debate in the House of Commons on
the United Kingdom adopting a Bill of Rights in 1975.50 In 1977, Lord Wade
introduced a Bill of Rights in the House of Lords.25" ' Indeed various bills to
enact a United Kingdom Bill of Rights were passed in the House of Lords in
1979, 1981, and 1985, but were not proceeded with in the House of
'44 id. at 193-94.
245 Id. at 194-95, 197.
246 Id. at 195-97.
24 ROBERT BLACKBURN, TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM 320 (1999).
248 id.
24' A full review and analysis of the complex political history of the HRA is beyond the scope
of this Article. There are a number of books that include the subject. See BLACKBURN, supra
note 247, at 5-14; see also PETER RIDDELL, PARUAMENT UNDER BLAIR 51-54,97 (2000); JOHN
WADHAM & HELEN MOUNTFIELD, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HuMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998, at
4-9 (1999).
250 WADHAM & MOuNTFIELD, supra note 249, at 6.
251 Christopher Baker, Chapter 1: The Act in Outline, in HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 1, 2 (Christopher Baker ed., 1998).
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Commons.252 During the eighteen years of the Thatcher and Major Conserva-
tive governments, there was no move by those administrations to adopt a Bill
of Rights. 3
In its "Manifesto" for the 1997 General Election, the Labor Party made a
commitment to redefine the status of the European Convention in British
domestic law.254 Labor issued a "Green Paper" entitled Bringing Rights Home,
which concluded: "We aim to change the relationship between the State and
the citizen, and to redress the dilution of individual rights by an over-
centralising government that has taken place over the past two decades. 255
In a subsequent Labor government "White Paper" entitled Rights Brought
Home: The Human Rights Bill, it was proposed to enhance the status of the
European Convention in United Kingdom domestic law.256 The White Paper
noted:
It takes on average five years to get an action into the
[ECHR]... and it costs an average of £30,000. Bringing these
rights home will mean that the British people will be able to
argue for their rights in the British courts-without this inordi-
nate delay and cost. It will also mean that the rights will be
brought much more fully into the jurisprudence of the courts
throughout the United Kingdom and their interpretation will thus
be far more subtly and powerfully woven into our law. 7
Despite the time and money required to take a case to the ECHR, there was
concern that the United Kingdom was the subject of a disproportionate number
of successful claims: "The fact that Britain has one of the highest number of
cases brought before the Court of Human Rights, with over half of the
violations having been found after 1990, clearly indicates that human rights are
252 BLACKBURN, supra note 247, at 8.
253 Id. at 9-10.
254 IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 620 (2003).
255 HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PUBLIC LAW &
HUMAN RIGHTS 856 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting Jack Straw & Paul Boateng, Bringing Rights Home:
Labour's Plans to Incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law, 1 EuR.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 71, 80 (1997)).
256 LOVELAND, supra note 254, at 620.
257 Id. (quoting Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, CM 3782 1.14 (1997)).
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currently not adequately protected and again underlines the need for this
Bill. , 258
When Home Secretary Jack Straw subsequently introduced the bill into the
House of Commons, he commented: "This is the first major Bill on human
rights for more than 300 years. It will strengthen representative and demo-
cratic government. It does so by enabling citizens to challenge more easily
actions of the state if they fail to match the standards set by the European
Convention."259
The original concept of Labor's reform program was a two-step process for
securing human rights. First, the European Convention would be incorporated
into U.K. domestic law. Then, after some period of time, the United Kingdom
would develop its own indigenous constitutional Bill of Rights.260
In a general sense, and although it remains a matter of some academic
debate, passage of the HRA carried out the first part of the plan. Robert
Blackburn, Professor of Constitutional Law at King's College, University of
London, flatly states the general legal consensus that the task of incorporating
the European Convention into U.K. domestic law is "now accomplished by the
Human Rights 1998. ' '261 Perhaps writing hyper-technically, Helen Fenwick
and Gavin Phillipson of the University of Dublin, assert:
The HRA does not "incorporate" the Convention rights into
substantive domestic law, since it does not provide that they are
to have the "force of law," the usual form of words used when
international treaties are incorporated into domestic law. Instead,
under [section] 1(2) of the HRA, certain of the rights... are to
"have effect for the purposes of this Act., 262
As will be seen, for present purposes, the prevailing view is that the HRA
has brought Convention rights to the United Kingdom to be determined by
U.K. courts. Nevertheless, as will also be seen, the significance of a judicial
finding of a violation of such rights is quite different from a finding by a U.S.
court of a violation of the U.S. Bill of Rights.
258 Ben Bradshaw, MP, The Human Rights Bill: Progress Through Parliament, in THE
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 1998: WHAT IT MEANS 58 (L. Betten ed., 1994).
259 Baker, supra note 251, at 3.
260 BLACKBuRN, supra note 247, at xxviii.
261 Id.
262 FENWICK & PHILUPSON, supra note 255, at 857.
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VI. REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON
TRANSSEXUAL PEOPLE (2000)
Finally, in April 1999, after enactment of the HRA but before its effective
date, the Home Secretary set up an Interdepartmental Working Group on
Transsexual People. 263 The Working Group was given the following terms of
reference: "to consider, with particular reference to birth certificates, the need
for appropriate legal measures to address the problems experienced by
transsexual people, having due regard to scientific and societal developments,
and measures taken in other countries to deal with this issue. '"264 The Working
Group solicited input from various groups and individuals advocating on
behalf of transsexual people,265 including Liberty and Press for Change.266
The Working Group's Report, issued in April 2000, cited studies suggesting
that in the United Kingdom there are 1300 to 2000 male-to-female and 250 to
400 female-to-male transsexual people.267 Primary concerns of transsexual
people were their "wish to have a birth certificate showing their new gender,
to marry in that gender and, most importantly, the grant of legal recognition of
their acquired gender for all purposes."268 The Report related the history of the
legal treatment of transsexual people by the United Kingdom2 69 and briefly
discussed some of the decisions of the ECHR in cases brought by transsexual
people against the United Kingdom.:'
The Working Group identified three options: "to retain the status quo and
leave the law unchanged; to issue birth certificates showing a transsexual
person's new name and, possibly sex; and to grant full legal recognition of the
acquired gender."27' The Working Group believed that the middle ground of
263 U.K. HOME OFFICE, REPORT ON THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON
TRANSSEXUALPEOPLE (2000) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT], available at http://www.
pfc.org.uk/workgrp/wgtrans.pdf.
264 id.
265 Many members of the transsexual community prefer the terms "transsexual people" or
"transsexual person" to "transsexuals" or "transsexual." See How to Respect a Transsexual
Person, at http://www.kisa.ca/respect.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). This Article has used
terminology as given in primary sources being discussed.
266 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 263, at 4-5, 41.
267 Id. at 3.
268 Id. at 3-4.
269 Id. at 6-18.
2'0 Id. at 4.
271 Id. at 5, 25.
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issuing new birth certificates without full legal recognition of the acquired
gender would be both unworkable and unsatisfactory:
The issue of certificates might, in some circumstances, save
transsexual people some embarrassment. But unless this carried
with it recognition for some or all legal purposes it would not do
much to relieve their underlying concerns.
We also considered whether, following the issue of a short
certificate showing the holder's new name and gender, a trans-
sexual person might be formally recognised as a member of their
new sex for certain specific purposes but not in all respects. But
we have not been able to identify any areas in which recognition
could be given without leading to confusion and uncertainty. We
were very doubtful whether there could be a halfway house
between the present position and full legal recognition for all
purposes.272
The Report strongly suggested the course of full legal recognition:
We think that there needs to be a formal stage when the
change of gender is recognised so that the legal position is clear,
even though the stage at which a transsexual person may apply
for the order may not be fixed. Full legal recognition could be
given by means of a Court Order which defined the date and
process from which the applicant acquired the new gender.
Legislation would be needed to define the grounds on which such
an Order could be made. The Registrar General would re-register
the birth on the basis of the information provided by the Court,
as happens now where a person is adopted.273
The Working Group added a number of significant caveats. First, no
change in legal status could completely eradicate information concerning the
gender into which the individual was born: "But there would be no rewriting
of history and the legislation would have to make it clear that in certain
circumstances access could be given to records held in the person's previous
identity, for example in connection with criminal investigations or medical
272 Id. at 19 (subheadings omitted).
273 Id. at 20.
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treatment. '274 Second, difficult decisions would have to be made in individual
cases as to the point at which that person would be entitled to be recognized
in the acquired gender. In the continuum of treatment this might be after some
period of living in the new gender role, undergoing hormonal treatment or after
surgery.271 Indeed, different individuals, for a variety of reasons, might stop
at different places within each stage.276 Third, there are some individuals who
revert to their birth gender at varying points along the continuum.277 Another
caveat was the concern as to whether, as is the case in several countries,
transsexual people must be provably sterile before they can be recognized in
their new gender.278 Still another problem involves the transsexual person in
a pre-existing marriage. Since the United Kingdom does not allow same-sex
marriage, it might be required that any pre-existing marriage be dissolved as
a precondition to legal recognition in the new gender.279 One relatively minor
concern is that the United Kingdom currently has different ages for men than
for women to be eligible for a state retirement pension: sixty-five for men, but
only sixty for women.28° Thus, full legal recognition would, for this purpose,
benefit male-to-female transsexual people, but prove a disadvantage for
female-to-male transsexual people.
A consultation paper to the Working Group suggested the interesting
concept of a two-stage procedure to deal with the problem of people who
revert to their original gender.28' Persons would first undergo a change in
"social gender," filing a "statutory declaration" with the registrar general of
their intention from a certain date to live in their new gender.282 The registrar
general, it was proposed, would issue a Receipt of the Statement of Intention
(ROTSI).2 3 This would enable the applicant to obtain various new official and
civic documents in the new name and gender.284 No less than two years after
274 id.
275 Id.
276 id.
277 Id. at 20, 41. For the extraordinary case of an individual who first underwent male to
female surgery and then female to male surgery, see Doctor Gave Me a Sex Change I Didn't
Want, DAILY ExPREss (London), Feb. 19, 2004, at 3.
278 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 263, at 21.
279 Id. at 20-21.
280 Id. at 23. The age differential will be gradually phased out during the years 2010-2020.
Id.
281 id. at 41-44.
282 Id. at 42.
283 id.
284 Id. at 43.
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issuance of the ROTSI, those who wished to do so could apply for full re-
registration in the new gender with issuance of a "Gender Confirmation
Certificate. 285
Although, as noted, the Working Group apparently favored some methodol-
ogy of full legal recognition of a transsexual person's new gender, it concluded
by suggesting that the Government "may wish to put the issues out to public
consultation." 86
VII. MODERN CHALLENGE TO CORBETr IN THE
COURT OF APPEAL: BELLINGER (2001)
Thirty years after Corbett, a new case arose in the British court system
which addressed the legality of a marriage between a man and a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual.287 While not necessarily legally significant, the
purported marriage in Bellinger v. Bellinger could not have been more
different from the Corbett-Ashley train wreck, Whereas Corbett and Ashley
barely cohabited after their wedding ceremony, remaining together for less
time than they were apart before the final break-up and lacking a satisfactory
sexual relationship, 8 the Bellingers had lived together for some two decades
since their marriage ceremony in 198 1.289 Whereas Corbett sought a decree of
nullity after Ashley allegedly had rebuffed his efforts to consummate the
marriage, g9 Elizabeth Ann Bellinger sought a judicial declaration that her
marriage to Michael Jeffrey Bellinger was valid, and Mr. Bellinger did not
oppose her petition.' 91 Rather, her petition was opposed by the Attorney
General, who intervened in the proceedings.
292
Mrs. Bellinger was born a male in 1946.293 At the age of twenty-one, she
(still a male) married a woman, but that marriage ended in divorce a few years
later.294 Following the divorce, she began to dress and live as a woman, and
285 id.
28 Id. at 25.
287 Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2002] 1 All E.R. 311, 333 (C.A. 2001), affd, [2003] 2 All E.R.
593 (H.L.).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
289 Bellinger, [20021 1 All E.R. at 311.
290 See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
29 Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] 2 All E.R. 593, 595 (H.L.).
292 See id. at 595-96.
293 Bellinger, [2002] 1 All E.R. at 313.
294 id.
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after various stages of treatment, underwent gender reassignment surgery in
1981.29 In May 1981, she went through a marriage ceremony with Mr.
Bellinger, who was fully aware of her background.296 On the marriage
certificate, Mrs. Bellinger described herself as a "spinster. 297 A chromosomal
test in 1999 showed that she had normal male chromosomes.298
The High Court received extensive affidavits from three experts in the field
of gender identity disorder. 299 Although Judge Johnson observed that there had
been a marked change in social attitudes towards transsexuals since Corbett
had been decided in 1970, he concluded that the medical criteria set out by
Judge Ormrod in Corbett remained valid.3" Since Mrs. Bellinger correctly had
been registered as a male at birth, Judge Johnson held that she remained male
at the time of the marriage ceremony; he thus refused to grant her requested
declaration.3"'
The Court of Appeal affirmed but, significantly, one of the three appellate
judges dissented. Looking to the Corbett decision,0 2 the majority concluded
that Parliament had enacted the Corbett rule into statutory law:
The judgment of [Judge Ormrod] was not appealed and its
conclusions were put on a statutory basis in the Nullity of
Marriage Act 1971, § 1 of which stated:
'A marriage which takes place after the commencement of
this Act shall be void on the following grounds only, that is to
say . . (c) that the parties are not respectively male and
female.'
Section 1(c) was re-enacted in § 11(c) of the Matrimonial
Clauses Act 1973, which applies to the present proceedings.3"3
The majority also considered the medical evidence presented in the High
Court. °" Louis Gooren, Professor of Endocrinology at the Free University
295 id.
296 Id.
297 id.
298 Id. at 314.
299 Id.
300 id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 314-16.
303 Id. at 316.
304 Id. at 318-25.
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Hospital, Amsterdam, clearly viewed transsexualism as a medical condition.0 5
He maintained, "[lit is no longer tenable to claim [that] the genetic or gonadal
criterion determines one's status as male or female."3" Rather, Professor
Gooren suggested that gender status is determined by "sexual differentiation"
in the brain.3 7 He cited a study he had co-authored in 1995, which stated,
"[Rlesearch into the human brain structure carried out post mortem showed
that a biological structure in the brain distinguished male-to-female transsexu-
als from men."3 '
Richard Green, a consultant psychiatrist and research director of the Gender
Identity Clinic at the Charine Cross Hospital, in contrast, reported that
transsexualism is a psychiatric disorder.3 0' He was highly critical of Corbett:
"The Corbett criteria are too reductionistic to serve as a viable set of criteria
to determine sex. They also ignore the compelling significance of the
psychological status of the person as a man or a woman."3 ' However,
Professor Green viewed the theory of a biological central nervous system basis
for male transsexualism as "neither refuted nor conformed [sic] ."3" He noted
that the Dutch study was conducted on a small sample of male transsexuals and
that studying the brain of a transsexual can only be done after death.312 While
acknowledging that Mrs. Bellinger's brain could not be dissected during her
lifetime and that she still possessed male XY chromosomes, Professor Green
concluded: "At present the patient is functioning as a woman, not as a man.
From that perspective the petitioner's sex could be judged to have changed."" 3
Mr. Timothy Terry, consultant urological surgeon at the Leicester
University Hospitals, which have a Gender Identity Disorder Group, gave this
assessment:
The psychological profile of [male-to-female] transsexuals is
female by medical definition. The only biological factor which
has not changed in such individuals is their chromosomal
305 Id. at 318.
306 Id. at 319.
307 Id.
30. Id. (quoting Zhou, Hofman, Gooren & Swaab, A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and
Its Relation to Transsexualiy, 378 NATURE 68 (1995)).
309 Id. at 320.
I'l Id. at 321.
311 id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 322.
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makeup. The paper reported in Nature in 1995 would suggest
this in itself may be irrelevant in the sexual development of
transsexuals. Accepting that transsexualism is a medically
.recognised condition and that such patients undergo appropriate
medical and surgical treatment to achieve their chosen sexual
orientation it seems to me irrelevant to consider the chromosome
makeup of an individual as the critical factor when determining
the rights of that individual in the society in which he/she lives.314
Based on these reports, the majority found that "the gender assignment at
birth of a transsexual in accordance with the Corbett criteria cannot be
challenged."3"' The question became whether assignment at birth is immuta-
ble.316 Relying on the statements by Professor Green and Mr. Terry, the
majority deemed transsexualism to be a psychiatric rather than medical
condition, according to presently accepted medical knowledge.317
The majority posited three additional factors not taken into account by
Judge Ormrod in Corbett in determining sex: (a) psychological, (b) secondary
sexual characteristics, and (c) brain differentiation. 318  According to the
majority, factors (b) and (c) were not realistic; nothing in the medical evidence
suggested secondary sexual characteristics as a primary factor, and brain
differentiation cannot be assessed in living people.3 9 As for factor (a), the
majority created something of a "Zeno's paradox":
There was no medical evidence, other than the psychological,
upon which the court could come to a conclusion different from
the criteria set out by [Judge Ormrod]. Although the psychologi-
cal factor was strongly relied upon by Professor Green, he did not
suggest a clear point at which the psychological changes had
reached a stage, with or without hormonal treatment and reas-
signment surgery, at which a person should be seen to have
become a member of the sex into which he/she was not born.320
314 Id. at 323.
315 Id.
316 Id.
31" id.
318 Id. at 324.
319 id.
320 Id. at 325.
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The majority further reviewed the case law in the United Kingdom post-
Corbett, case law from other countries (including an early case from the
United States which will be discussed infra pp. 402-409), and the various
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.32' The majority also cited
the Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People.322
The court had inquired of the Attorney General as to any steps being taken by
any governmental department to implement any of the recommendations of the
report or to prepare a consultation paper for public discussion. 323 The majority
expressed chagrin with the Lord Chancellor's response:
To our dismay, we were informed that no steps whatsoever have
been, or to the knowledge of Mr. Moylan were intended to be,
taken to carry this matter forward. It appears, therefore, that the
commissioning and completion of the report is the sum of the
activity on the problems identified both by the Home Secretary
in his terms of reference, and by the conclusions of the members
of the working party. That would seem to us to be a failure to
recognise the increasing concerns and changing attitudes across
western Europe which have been set out so clearly and strongly
in judgments of members of the European Court of Human
Rights at Strasbourg, and which in our view need to be addressed
by the United Kingdom.3 24
After this lengthy discussion of the medical and legal situation of
transsexuals, the majority produced remarkably brief and admittedly
unsatisfactory "[g]eneral conclusions." '325 The majority explained that, for
"obvious reasons," it is necessary to assign the sex of a child at birth.326 It
further declared that changes in social attitudes toward transsexuals "cannot
be ignored. 3 27 The majority also focused on the lack of legislation delineating
the point at which a person can change his gender status for purposes of
marriage. 32' The majority cited German legislation under which a change in
31 Id. at 325-32.
312 Id. at 332.
313 id. at 332-33.
324 Id. at 333.
325 Id. at 333-35.
326 Id. at 333.
327 Id.
328 Id.
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gender can only be recognized where the person: (i) has lived for at least three
years in the new gender, (ii) is unmarried, (iii) is of age, (iv) is permanently
sterile, and (v) has undergone an operation by which clear resemblance to the
new sex has been achieved.329 In the majority's view, the setting of such
conditions is a matter of public policy-not for the courts.330
Ultimately, the majority concluded that Mrs. Bellinger's gender status is a
question for the court, assessing the facts against a clear statutory
framework. 3 In the absence of such a framework, the court should not act to
fill the gap; the majority therefore held that Mrs. Bellinger's appeal must be
dismissed.332
With both unease and prescience, however, the majority noted:
We would add however, with the strictures of the European
Court of Human Rights well in mind, that there is no doubt that
the profoundly unsatisfactory nature of the present position and
the plight of transsexuals requires careful consideration. The
recommendation of the Inter-departmental Working Group for
public consultation merits action by the government departments
involved in these issues. The problems will not go away and may
well come again before the European court sooner rather than
later.333
Judge Thorpe dissented at some length.3" Although he noted the decisions
of the ECHR, he focused on domestic law, especially Corbett.33 5 In Corbett,
Judge Ormrod cited expert opinion that there are at least four criteria for
assessing the sexual condition of an individual: (i) chromosomes, (ii) gonads,
(iii) genitalia, and (iv) psychology.3 6 Judge Ormrod also found agreement
among the experts that the biological sexual constitution of an individual is
fixed at birth at the latest.337 He further found that sex is an essential
determinant of the relationship of marriage because marriage is and always has
329 Id. at 334.
330 id.
331 id.
332 Id. at 334-35.
311 Id. at 335.
334 Id. at 335-50.
31 Id. at 338-42.
336 Id. at 339.
337 Id.
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been recognized as a union of a man and a woman. 38 Judge Ormrod
consequently reasoned that the law should look only at the first three factors,
i.e., the biological factors, and disregard the psychological factor, in determin-
ing a person's sex for purposes of marriage.339 Judge Ormrod's stated rationale
for focusing solely on the biological factors was that the experts confused sex
with gender and that marriage depends on the former and not on the latter.34 °
Judge Thorpe examined each of Judge Ormrod' s propositions in turn. First,
Judge Thorpe observed that although the experts in Corbett had agreed, thirty
years earlier, that the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at
birth at the latest, the three experts in Bellinger rejected this view.
Judge Ormrod's second fundamental proposition, that marriage is and
always has been the union of a man and a woman, has been eroded, in Judge
Thorpe's view, by enormous societal changes since Victorian times when Lord
Penzance sought to define marriage "throughout Christendom" as "the
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all
others."34' Judge Thorpe would "redefine marriage as a contract for which the
parties elect but which is regulated by the state, both in its formation and in its
termination by divorce, because it affects status upon which depend a variety
of entitlements, benefits and obligations. '"342
Skipping to Judge Ormrod's fourth proposition, that marriage depends on
sex and not on gender, Judge Thorpe argued that it is now of doubtful
validity.343 In any marriage, one or both of the parties may have to accommo-
date physical factors of the other which affect the essential sexual dimension
of the couple's relationship.' In cases such as the one before the court, Judge
Thorpe would find that the sexual dimension is "sufficiently fulfilled. 345
Moreover, Judge Thorpe stated that gender rather than sex has steadily
increased as a defining characteristic of an individual.3"
In Judge Thorpe's view, it is Judge Ormrod's third proposition that sex
should be determined solely on physical rather than psychological factors,
338 id.
339 Id. at 339-40.
340 Id. at 340.
"4 Id. at 340-41 (quoting Hyde v. Hyde, [1861-1873] All E.R. 175, 177 (L.R.-R.&D.)).
342 Id. at 341.
343 Id.
344 rd.
345 id.
346 id.
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which has the most direct bearing on the outcome of the case.347 Although it
may be more complicated forjudges to consider the psychological dimension
in determining gender, a test without consideration of the psychological factor
is "manifestly incomplete. 348
Judge Thorpe noted that a court had recently relied heavily on psychologi-
cal factors in a nullity action involving an "inter-sex male-to-female. 3 49 In
that case, the Family Division found the wife to be female at the date of the
marriage, although at birth her chromosomal sex was male, her gonadal sex
was male, and her genital sex was ambiguous but more male than female.35 °
Judge Thorpe then turned to the Attorney General's three main arguments:
first, that expert opinion did not show that Mrs. Bellinger was and always was
female or had become female; second, that the complexities of the issues
demanded that any change come from Parliament; and three, that acceding to
Mrs. Bellinger's petition would create enormous difficulties, even in the
context of the transsexual's right to marry.3"'
Judge Thorpe considered the first argument to be contrary to the expert
testimony that Mrs. Bellinger was psychologically a female and that, post-
operatively, her only remaining male feature is chromosomal.352
The Attorney General's second argument, that the issue should be dealt
with legislatively, required a fuller response. Judge Thorpe was sensitive to
the concept of Parliamentary supremacy, but he noted that Parliament had
failed to provide any definition of the words "male" and "female" in section
11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973."' 3 Moreover, this statutory
provision had not been previously judicially construed, so it was the duty of
the court to construe it in light of the moral, ethical, and societal values as they
are now. 354  Additionally, the Attorney General had admitted that the
government was taking no action to implement any of the suggestions of the
Report of the Inter Departmental Working Group on Transsexual Persons, thus
leaving a legal void.355
347 Id. at 342.
348 id.
39 Id. at 342-43 (quoting W v. W, [2001] Fain. 111).
350 id.
311 id. at 344.
352 id.
313 Id. at 344-45.
354 Id. at 345.
115 Id. at 345-46.
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As to the Attorney General's third argument, that any relaxation of the
present clear-cut boundary would produce enormous practical and legal
difficulties, Judge Thorpe acknowledged "that to give full legal recognition to
the transsexual's right to acquire (perhaps not irreversibly) his or her
psychological gender gives rise to many wide-ranging problems, some
profoundly difficult. 35 6 The only issue, however, was to recognize the validity
of a marriage of a post-operative transsexual in her new gender, a far more
limited question.357 While there might arise difficult cases in the future, the
cases of "fully achieved post-operative transsexuals" would be manageable.358
Other countries within Europe already recognized the ability of transsexuals
to marry in their acquired gender without too much apparent difficulty, as did
the common law jurisdiction of New Zealand.35 9
Judge Thorpe did not question that the Corbett decision was correct when
it was handed down in 1970.360 Subsequently, however, knowledge of
transsexualism had developed. In 1980, for example, the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) introduced the diagnosis of
transsexualism for gender dysphoric individuals who met certain diagnostic
361criteria.
Cutting to the heart of the matter, Judge Thorpe opined:
To make the chromosomal factor conclusive, or even dominant,
seems to me particularly questionable in the context of marriage.
For it is an invisible feature of an individual, incapable of
perception or registration other than by scientific test. It makes
no contribution to the physiological or psychological self. Indeed
in the context of the institution of marriage as it is today it seems
to me right as a matter of principle and logic to give predomi-
nance to psychological factors just as it seems right to carry out
the essential assessment of gender at or shortly before the time of
marriage rather than at the time of birth.362
356 Id. at 346.
357 id.
358 id.
"5 Id. at 346-47.
36 Id. at 347.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 348.
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Judge Thorpe noted that the United Kingdom lagged years behind other
European countries on this issue. 63 He concluded:
One of the objectives of statute law reform in this field must be
to ensure that the law reacts to and reflects social change. That
must also be an objective of the judges in this field in the
construction of existing statutory provisions. I am strongly of the
opinion that there are not sufficiently compelling reasons, having
regard to the interests of others affected or, more relevantly, the
interests of society as a whole, to deny this appellant legal
recognition of her marriage. I would have allowed this appeal.3 4
VIII. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS'
ABOUT-FACE: GOODWIN AND 1 (2002)
In July 2002, on the fifth and sixth challenges to the United Kingdom's
treatment of transsexuals to reach the European Court of Human Rights, the
ECHR finally and clearly found violations of the European Convention.
Goodwin v. United Kingdom involved an individual who had been born a male
in 1937.365 In the mid-1960s, Goodwin was diagnosed as a transsexual, but
nevertheless married a woman and had four children by her.366 In the mid
1980s, Goodwin began serious treatment for transsexualism, culminating in
gender reassignment surgery in 1990.367 At some point, Goodwin got divorced,
but she "continued to enjoy the love and support of her children. 368
Goodwin asserted violations of Articles 8, 12, 13, and 14 of the Conven-
tion.16 9 She claimed a number of job-related, economic, and personal
difficulties resulting directly or indirectly from the United Kingdom's refusal
to alter her legal records and to treat her as a female.37 ° She claimed that she
had been sexually harassed by colleagues at work and was not able to pursue
a case of sexual harassment in the Industrial Tribunal because she was
363 id.
364 Id. at 350.
365 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002).
366 Id. at 455.
367 id.
368 Id.
369 Id. at 447.
370 Id. at 455-56, 478.
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considered in law to be a man.37' When she started a new job, she was
required to provide her National Insurance (NI) number, which allowed her
employer to trace back her identity, leading to problems at work. 2 The
Department, of Social Security (DSS) refused to issue her a new NI.373
Additionally, the DSS Contributions Agency informed Goodwin that she
would be ineligible for a state pension at the age of sixty (the eligibility age for
women) and that she would have to continue to make pension contributions
until she turned sixty-five (the eligibility age for men).374 In a number of
instances, Goodwin chose to forego various advantages which were condi-
tional upon producing her birth certificate.375 She also was required to pay the
higher motor insurance premiums applicable to men.376
On the personal level, Goodwin asserted that she currently enjoys a "full
physical relationship" with a man, but that she and her male partner cannot
many under U.K. law.377
Initially the ECHR addressed the issue of stare decisis. 3 78 It acknowledged
that it had addressed the United Kingdom's failure to give legal recognition to
the acquired gender of post-operative transsexuals in several prior cases.379
The ECHR generally does not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, but
neither does it simply ignore its own precedent from one case to the next. As
the ECHR had explained in another case decided a few months before
Goodwin:
The applicant's counsel attempted to persuade the Court that a
finding in this case would not create a general precedent or any
risk to others. It is true that it is not this Court's role under
Article 34 of the Convention to issue opinions in the abstract but
to apply the Convention to the concrete facts of the individual
case. However, judgments issued in individual cases establish
371 Id. at 455.
372 Id. at 455-56.
171 Id. at 456.
374 id.
375 id.
376 Id. One cannot help but wonder whether male-to-female transsexuals as a group drive
more safely than do men in general.
371 Id. at 478. The Court's decision is not clear as to whether Goodwin and her partner
actually wished to marry. Id.
... Id. at 448.
379 id.
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precedents albeit to a greater or lesser extent and a decision in
this case could not, either in theory or practice, be framed in such
a way as to prevent application in later cases.38
Notwithstanding the several precedents already cited in which the ECHR had
found that the United Kingdom's refusal to legally recognize sex changes did
not violate the Human Rights Convention, the ECHR in Goodwin felt
compelled to consider the matter afresh:
While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous
judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability
and equality before the law that it should not depart, without
good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases.
However, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for
the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the
changing conditions within the respondent State and within
Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to any
evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved. It is of
crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied
in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not
theoretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to maintain a
dynamic and evolving approach would indeed risk rendering it a
bar to reform or improvement."'
The ECHR then proceeded to find such "good reason" to depart from its
priorjudgments, although it is difficult to ascertain how the situation was truly
different in 2002 than it had been in 1998, when the ECHR decided Sheffield
and Horsham, or than it had been when the earlier cases were decided. The
Goodwin court found that the "stress and alienation arising from the discor-
dance between the position in society assumed by the post-operative transsex-
ual and the status imposed by law which refuses to recognize the change in
gender cannot be regarded as a minor inconvenience arising from a
formality." '382 Exactly how this situation was more serious or difficult for
Goodwin than it had been for Sheffield or Horsham or, for that matter, Cossey
or Rees over a decade earlier, is left unexplained.
"' Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 39 (2002).
381 Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 448.
382 Id. at 449.
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The ECHR found it illogical for a state to authorize and subsidize the
treatment and surgery alleviating the condition of the transsexual and then to
refuse to recognize the legal implications of the result.383 Nevertheless the cost
of Rees's surgery was borne by the National Health Service.3 So was
Cossey' S.385 The United Kingdom had "made it possible for X to undergo the
surgery which brought his physiology into conformity with his psychology." '386
In a partly dissenting opinion in Sheffield and Horsham, it was noted that the
United Kingdom subsidizes gender reassignment surgery.387 Why it was any
less logical in 2002 than previously for the United Kingdom to subsidize
gender reassignment surgery but not legally accept the reassignment is not
explained by the ECHR. Additionally, is the ECHR in Goodwin suggesting
that the United Kingdom would not run afoul of the European Convention if
it simply refused to subsidize treatment for gender dysphoria? Surely that
would not be a result favored by the transsexual community.
The ECHR was able, somewhat more forthrightly, to point to British
acknowledgments of the unsatisfactory nature of the state of the law regarding
transsexuals in the United Kingdom, expressed by the Interdepartmental
Working Group on Transsexual People388 and in the Court of Appeal decision
in Bellinger.389 On the other hand, an updated submission by the interest
group, Liberty, revealed no change since the Sheffield and Horsham decision
in the number of Member States of the Council of Europe giving full legal
recognition of gender reassignment.390 Liberty did cite a 2001 decision from
Australia that validated a transsexual's marriage in his new gender. 39'
In reply to Goodwin's various complaints implicating Article 8 of the
European Convention, the right to respect for private life, the United Kingdom
argued that there was still no generally accepted approach to these matters
among the Contracting States, and in view of the margin of appreciation, the
United Kingdom's lack of legal recognition of Goodwin's new gender did not
383 id.
38' Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 57-58 (1986).
385 Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, 645 (1990).
386 X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 179 (1997).
387 Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 22885/93,23390/94,27 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 163, 203 (1998).
388 Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 449,462-64, 473.
389 Id. at 449,464-65,473-74.
390 Id. at 466.
'9' Id. at 466-67 (citing In re Kevin, [2001] Fam. 1974).
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violate Article 8.392 The United Kingdom argued that Goodwin did not suffer
"practical and actual detriment and humiliation on a daily basis" as most of her
documents had been reissued to show her new name and acquired gender.393
It argued that a fair balance had been struck between the rights of the
individual and the general interest of the community. 4
The Court, as before, deemed this to be a matter of whether the United
Kingdom had failed to comply with a "positive obligation" to ensure the rights
of a transsexual within its "margin of appreciation." '395 Nevertheless, the Court
also stated (perhaps loosely), "It must be recognized that serious interference
with private life can arise where the state of domestic law conflicts with an
important aspect of personal identity." '396
The Court acknowledged that there remained a "lack of a common
European approach as to how to address the repercussions which the legal
recognition of a change of sex may entail for other areas of law such as
marriage, filiation, privacy or data protection." '397 Unlike its resolution in prior
cases, however, the Court merely stated that "in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity," it is up to the Contracting State "to decide on the measures
necessary to secure Convention rights within their jurisdiction" within its
"margin of appreciation." 398
In striking the balance between the individual and the state, the Court
concluded unanimously that the United Kingdom was in violation of Article
8:
Nonetheless, the very essence of the Convention is respect for
human dignity and human freedom. Under Article 8 of the
Convention in particular, where the notion of personal autonomy
is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its
guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of each
individual, including the right to establish details of their identity
as individual human beings. In the twenty first century the right
of transsexuals to personal development and to physical and
moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others in society
392 Id. at 469.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 470.
395 Id. at 470-71.
396 Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
397 Id. at 475.
398 id.
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cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the lapse
of time to cast clearer light on the issues involved. In short, the
unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals live
in an intermediate zone is [sic] not quite one gender or the other
is no longer sustainable.399
With a much shorter analysis, the Court likewise unanimously found the
United Kingdom to be in breach of Article 12, the right to marry.4" The Court
acknowledged that Article 12 refers explicitly to the right of "men and
women" to marry.4O' The Court nevertheless was "not persuaded" that it can
still be assumed that the terms must refer to a determination of gender by
purely biological criteria.4 °2 Rather, "[T]he applicant in this case lives as a
woman, is in a relationship with a man and would only wish to marry a man.
She has no possibility of doing so. In the Court's view, she may therefore
claim that the very essence of her right to marry has been infringed. 4 3
Turning to the appropriate remedies, the Court found it inappropriate to
award damages to Goodwin. Her financial losses were not clear-cut; while she
had not been able to retire as a woman at age sixty, she had kept working and
enjoying a salary.4° It was really the lack of legal recognition that was at the
heart of her complaints, and thus the finding by the Court of violation of the
Convention, "with the consequences which will ensue for the future, may in
these circumstances be regarded as constituting just satisfaction.4 5
Unable to enjoin the United Kingdom to change its laws regarding
transsexuals, the Court set forth the United Kingdom's future obligations in
language depressingly reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court's "with all
deliberate speed" edict for desegregation in 1955.406 The European Court of
Human Rights simply declared:
399 id. at 476.
400 Id. at 478-81,484.
401 Id. at 478-79.
402 Id. at 479.
403 Id. at 480. The Court unanimously found there to be no separate issue arising under
Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) and no violation of Article 13 (effective remedy before
a national authority). Id. at 447, 481-82, 484.
401 Id. at 483.
405 Id. The Court did award Goodwin costs and expenses in a somewhat smaller amount than
she requested. Id. at 483-84.
406 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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The Court has found that the situation, as it has evolved, no
longer falls within the United Kingdom's margin of appreciation.
It will be for the United Kingdom Government in due course to
implement such measures as it considers appropriate to fulfil its
obligations to secure the applicant's, and other transsexuals',
right to respect for private life and right to marry in compliance
with this judgment."
On the same day as the Goodwin decision, the Court also handed down its
decision in the companion case of L v. United Kingdom.48 This case also
involved a male-to-female transsexual.4 °9 In language often identical to that
in the Goodwin case, the Court reached all the same conclusions as it had in
Goodwin.41 °
IX. BELLINGER IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS (2003)
A. The Holdings
In April 2003, some nine months after the decisions of the ECHR in
Goodwin and I., the Law Lords of the House of Lords handed down their
decision on the appeal in Bellinger.4  In her appeal, Mrs. Bellinger not only
reasserted that her purported marriage in 1981 to Mr. Bellinger was valid
under British law, but also asserted for the first time before the Law Lords that
section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is incompatible with
Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention.412
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead reviewed the state of the law in the United
Kingdom and in overseas jurisdictions, the decisions of the courts below, the
decisions of the ECHR, and developments in the United Kingdom since
Goodwin.4" 3 Lord Nicholls noted that in December 2002 the British govern-
ment had announced its intention to bring forward "primary legislation" which
would allow transsexuals who could demonstrate that they had taken decisive
steps toward living fully and permanently in the acquired gender to marry in
4o7 Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 483 (emphasis added).
408 I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94, 36 Eur. H.R. 967 (2002).
409 id. at 975.
410 Id. at 975-99.
41 Bellinger v. Bellinger, t20031 2 All E.R. 593, 593 (H.L.).
412 Id. at 596.
411 Id. at 598-601.
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that gender. 4 The legislation (which had not yet been published even in draft
outline) would also deal with other issues arising from the legal recognition of
acquired gender.415
Lord Nicholls expressed great sympathy for persons in Mrs. Bellinger's
situation:
My Lords, I am profoundly conscious of the humanitarian
considerations underlying Mrs Bellinger' s claim. Much suffering
is involved for those afflicted with gender identity disorder. Mrs
Bellinger and others similarly placed do not undergo prolonged
and painful surgery unless their turmoil is such that they cannot
otherwise live with themselves. Non-recognition of their
reassigned gender can cause them acute distress. I have this very
much in mind."'
Nevertheless, Lord Nicholls concluded that the House of Lords, sitting in
its judicial capacity, should not grant Mrs. Bellinger the primary relief she
sought: legal recognition of her marriage to Mr. Bellinger." 7 Such recognition
would, in Lord Nicholls's view, give the terms "male" and "female," as used
in section 1 l(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, "a novel, extended
meaning: that a person may be born with one sex but later become, or become
regarded as, a person of the opposite sex."418
Lord Nicholls explained:
This would represent a major change in the law, having far-
reaching ramifications. It raises issues whose solution calls for
extensive inquiry and the widest public consultation and discus-
sion. Questions of social policy and administrative feasibility
arise at several points, and their interaction has to be evaluated
and balanced. The issues are altogether ill-suited for determina-
tion by courts and court procedures. They are pre-eminently a
matter for Parliament, the more especially when the government,
in unequivocal terms, has already announced its intention to
411 Id. at 601.
415 id.
416 Id. at 602.
411 Id. at 603.
418 id.
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introduce comprehensive primary legislation on this difficult and
sensitive subject.419
Lord Nicholls deemed the following issues to be beyond judicial compe-
tence: (1) At what point in the continuum of treatment is it appropriate for the
law to deem that a transsexual has acquired the new gender? Would the
individual have to be unmarried. Would the individual have to be sterile? (2)
What implications would legal recognition for purposes of marriage entail for
other purposes? (3) Would recognition for purposes of marriage mean the
legalization of same-sex marriage?4 20
However, speaking for the unanimous bench, Lord Nicholls did grant Mrs.
Bellinger a declaration that insofar as U.K. law makes no provision for
recognition of gender reassignment for purposes of marriage, it is incompatible
with Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention.42" ' The declaration of
incompatibility was mandated by the ECHR's decision in Goodwin.22
Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Scott of
Foscote, and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry each concurred in both parts of the
judgment, denying Mrs. Bellinger's petition for legal recognition of her
marriage, but granting her petition for a declaration of incompatibility with the
European Convention.423
B. Implications of "Incompatibility"
A finding by the highest court in the United Kingdom, the Law Lords of the
House of Lords, that a statutory law is incompatible with an international
treaty to which the United Kingdom had bound itself and which had long since
entered into force in the United Kingdom and subsequently been incorporated
into its domestic law, is not equivalent to a finding by the United States
Supreme Court that a statute violates the U.S. Constitution.
Exactly two hundred years before Bellinger, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief
Justice Marshall set the template for American constitutional law:
419 id.
420 See id. at 603-05.
421 Id. at 605-06.
422 id.
423 id. at 606-14.
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It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is....
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law
and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court
must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding
the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case....
[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void.424
The finding by the House of Lords in Bellinger has no such direct effect.
The Human Rights Act 1998 provides both the authority for, and limitations
of, a declaration that British law is incompatible with the European Conven-
tion. Section 2, Interpretation of Convention Rights, provides in subsection
(1):
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in
connection with a Convention right must take into account any-
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the
European Court of Human Rights ....
Whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court
or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question
has arisen. 25
As a practical matter, this provision compelled the House of Lords in Bellinger
to take into account the ECHR' s decision in Goodwin, which was directly on
point and clearly not distinguishable.
The House of Lords might have utilized section 3(1) of the HRA to finesse
the problem through statutory interpretation: "So far as it is possible to do so,
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect
in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights." '426 The House of
Lords did not believe it could interpret the term "female" in the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973 to include a male-to-female transsexual even though
424 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78, 180 (1803).
425 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 2(1)(a) (Eng.) [hereinafter HRA] (emphasis added).
426 Id. § 3(1).
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Parliament had not provided a statutory definition of the term. Lord Nicholls
opined:
I am firmly of the view that your Lordships' House, sitting in its
judicial capacity, ought not to accede to the submissions made on
behalf of Mrs Bellinger. Recognition of Mrs Bellinger as female
for the purposes of 11(c) of the 1973 Act would necessitate
giving the expressions 'male' and 'female' in that Act a novel,
extended meaning: that a person may be born with one sex but
later become, or become regarded as, a person of the opposite
sex. 427
Addressing the issue in more detail, Lord Hope, in his concurring opinion,
added:
If it could be said that the use of the words 'male' and 'female'
in 11 (c) of the 1973 Act was ambiguous, it would have been
possible to have regard to [the Goodwin] decision in seeking to
resolve the ambiguity. But, for the reasons which I have given,
I do not think that there is any such ambiguity. Then there is 3(1)
of the Human Rights Act 1998, which places a duty on the courts
to read and give effect to legislation in a way that is compatible
with the convention rights if it is possible to do so. But we are
being asked in this case to make a declaration about the validity
of a marriage ceremony which was entered into on 2 May 1981,
and 3(1) of the 1998 Act is not retrospective .... The interpreta-
tive obligation which 3(1) provides is not available. 28
Lord Hobhouse, more in accord with Lord Nicholls, stated:
The threshold question is whether, by applying 3, it is possible,
as a matter of interpretation, to 'read down' 11 (c) of the 1973 Act
so as to include additional words such as 'or two people of the
same sex one of whom has changed his/her sex to that of the
opposite sex.' This would in my view not be an exercise in
interpretation however robust. It would be a legislative exercise
427 Bellinger, [2003] 2 All E.R. at 603.
428 Id. at 609.
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of amendment making a legislative choice as to what precise
amendment was appropriate. 29
Failing to resolve the problem through statutory construction (or decons-
truction), the House of Lords had little choice but to employ section 4(a) of the
HRA: "If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a
Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility. 4 3 °
In Bellinger in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor argued that
although section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Action 1973 as so inter-
preted was incompatible with Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention,431
a judicial declaration to that effect would serve no useful purpose because the
U.K. government was already under an obligation to amend the offending
legislation by virtue of the Goodwin and I. decisions under HRA § 10(l)(b).432
Lord Nicholls rejected this argument. "[I]t is desirable that in a case of such
sensitivity this House, as the court of final appeal in this country, should
formally record that the present state of statute law is incompatible with the
Convention. 433
As noted by Lord Nicholls, "[a] declaration of incompatibility triggers the
ministerial powers to amend the offending legislation under the 'fast track'
procedures set out in section 10 and Schedule 2 of the Human Rights Act
1998. '43 Under section 10, "if a provision of legislation has been declared
under section 4 to be incompatible with a Convention right," then "[i]f a
Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for
proceeding under this section, he may by order make such amendments to the
legislation as he considers necessary to remove the incompatibility.,
43 5
However, in contradistinction to American constitutionaljurisprudence per
Marbury, the effect in Bellinger of the judicial declaration of incompatibility
is not to nullify the legislation. Unless the legislation were amended, a "fully
realized" post-operative transsexual in the United Kingdom would remain
legally a member of his original gender, unable to marry someone of that
gender.
429 Id. at 613.
430 HRA, supra note 425, § 4(2).
411 See Bellinger, [2003] 2 All E.R. at 601.
432 Id. at 606.
433 id.
434 id.
435 HRA, supra note 425, § 10(1)(a), (2).
2005]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
In Loving v. Virginia in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Virginia's
anti-miscegenation law, barring whites and blacks from marrying each other,
was unconstitutional.436 Accordingly, by virtue of that decision, the marriage
of Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, became
legal, and their criminal convictions for getting married were overturned
notwithstanding Virginia's statute.437
In Bellinger, despite the House of Lords' holding that the statute preventing
the Bellingers' marriage from being legal violates their human rights, which
have been incorporated into British domestic law, their marriage remained
invalid.438
X. A THIRD MANDATE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, K.B. (2004)
In addition to the mandates from the ECHR in Goodwin and . in July 2002
and from the House of Lords in Bellinger in April 2003, that the United
Kingdom must in some fashion legally recognize the acquired gender of
transsexuals, in January 2004 a third mandate issued, this one from the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). K.B. v. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency
involved K.B., a female, and her significant other, R., a person who was born
and registered at birth as a female, but who, in the words of the ECJ,
"following surgical gender reassignment, has become a man." '439 Contrary to
their wishes, R. and K.B. have not been able to marry in the United Kingdom,
although their union was celebrated in an "adapted church ceremony.""' K.B.
wished to name R. as the beneficiary of her National Health Service (NES)
widower's pension if she should predecease R., but the NHS Pensions Agency
informed her that she could not do so because she and R. were not legally
married."'
K.B. unsuccessfully challenged this refusal domestically, first before the
Employment Tribunal and then before the Employment Appeal Tribunal
(London)."2 She next took her case to the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales (Civil Division), which stayed the case and referred the following
436 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1967).
417 Id. at 2, 12.
... Bellinger, [2003] 2 All E.R. at 605-06.
439 Case C-117/01, K.B. v. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency, [2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 28, 112
(2004).
4 id.
-I Id. 1 13.
442 Id. ( 14-15.
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question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling: "Does the exclusion of the
female-to-male transsexual partner of a female member of the National Health
Service Pension Scheme, which limits the material dependent's benefit to her
widower, constitute sex discrimination in contravention of Article 141
[European Community] and Directive 75/117?"' 4 EC Treaty Article 141
provides:
1. Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal
pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal
value is applied.
2. For the purpose of this article, "pay" means the ordinary basic
or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether
in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or indi-
rectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer.'t
Article 1 of Council Directive 75/117 provides:
The principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in
Article 119 of the Treaty, hereinafter called "principle of equal
pay," means, for the same work or for work to which equal value
is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of
sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration." 5
Article 3 of the Directive further provides: "Member States shall abolish all
discrimination between men and women arising from laws, regulations or
administrative provisions which is contrary to the principle of equal pay. '
The ECJ acknowledged that the requirement that individuals be married in
order for the surviving partner to receive the deceased partner's pension cannot
be regarded per se as discriminatory on the basis of sex.447 In this case,
however, the ECJ found inequality of treatment related to a necessary
precondition for the grant of such a pension: the capacity to marry. "
44 Id. 16.
, Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002,
O.J. (C 325) art. 141 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty], http://europa.eu.intleur-lexlen/treaties/dat
C_2002325EN.003301.htmi.
", Council Directive 75/117, art. 1, 1975 0.1. (L 045) 19, 19.
44 Id. art. 3.
147 K.B., [2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 28, IN 28-29.
48 Id. T 30.
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The ECJ cited the ECHR' s decisions in Goodwin and I for the proposition
that the United Kingdom's refusal to allow a couple in K.B. and R.'s situation
to marry violates Article 12 of the European Convention. ' 9 Accordingly, the
ECJ ruled:
Legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which,
in breach of the ECHR, prevents a couple such as K.B. and R.
from fulfilling the marriage requirement which must be met for
one of them to be able to benefit from part of the pay of the other
must be regarded as being, in principle, incompatible with the
requirements of Article 141 EC.450
However, like the ECHR in Goodwin and , the ECJ did not attempt to
mandate the appropriate solution to this incompatibility:
Since it is for the Member States to determine the conditions
under which legal recognition is given to the change of gender of
a person in R.'s situation-as the European Court of Human
Rights has accepted (Goodwin v United Kingdom, § 103)-it is
for the national court to determine whether in a case such as that
in the main proceedings a person in K.B.'s situation can rely on
Article 141 EC in order to gain recognition of her right to
nominate her partner as the beneficiary of a survivor s pension.
45
'
XI. THE GENDER RECOGNmTON ACT 2004
Even while Bellinger was pending in the House of Lords, the U.K.
government announced in June 2002 that it would reconvene the Working
Group on Transsexual People to reconsider the legal issues affecting
transsexuals.4 2 The Working Group's agreed terms of reference were: "In the
light of the report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual
People and more recent relevant developments, to re-examine the implications
441 Id. 133.
15 Id. 34.
451 Id. 135.
452 U.K. Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, Transsexual People-Update (Aug. 2002), htp:II
www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/tpeople.htm.
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of granting full legal status to transsexual people in their acquired gender; and
to make recommendations." '453
Baroness Scotland of Asthal, in response to Parliamentary questions, stated
that the Working Group, which met in July 2002 shortly after the ECHR had
issued the Goodwin and L decisions, "[had] been tasked additionally with
considering urgently the implications of [those] judgments., 454
On December 13, 2002, Rosie Winterton, MP, Parliamentary Secretary at
the Lord Chancellor's Department, issued a formal Government Announce-
ment that stated:
We will aim to publish, in due course, a draft outline Bill to
give legal recognition in their acquired gender to transsexual
people who can demonstrate that they have taken decisive steps
towards living fully and permanently in the gender acquired since
they were registered at birth. That will make it possible for them
(if otherwise eligible) to marry in their acquired gender.
The Government is conmitted, therefore, to legislating as
soon as possible to give transsexual people their Convention
rights.455
On July 11,2003, the one-year anniversary of the Goodwin and L decisions,
the U.K. government published a draft Gender Recognition Bill (GRB) for pre-
legislative scrutiny by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. 56 In announc-
ing publication of the draft bill, Lord Filkin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at
the Department for Constitutional Affairs, explained that the bill would
"establish a Gender Recognition Panel with the power to decide applications
from transsexual people seeking legal recognition in their acquired gender." '457
On November 27, 2003, the government formally introduced the GRB in
the House of Lords.458 In its Introduction and Background to the Gender
453 Id.
454 Id.
455 U.K. Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, Government Announcement on Transsexual People
(Dec. 13, 2002) (by Rosie Winterton, MP, Parliamentary Secretary at the Lord Chancellor's
Department), http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/statement.htm.
456 U.K. Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, Government Announcement onTranssexual People
(July 11,2003) (Lord Filkin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Department for Constitutional
Affairs), http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/I110703statement.htm.
457 Id.
458 U.K. Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, Introduction and Background to the Gender
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Recognition Bill, published in November 2003, the government cited the
Goodwin, I., and Bellinger decisions.459 The government's Final Regulatory
Impact Assessment (RIA), also issued in November 2003, noted, "All other
signatories to the [European] Convention, with the exception of Ireland and
Andorra, provide transsexual people with legal recognition in their acquired
gender."'460 The RIA recognized at least two types of risks: risk to the well-
being of transsexual people who suffer embarrassing and distressing situations
due to legal non-recognition (according to Press for Change, eighty percent of
transsexual people seriously contemplate suicide) and risk to the United
Kingdom of further legal challenges if it fails to rectify breaches of Convention
rights.46' The RIA estimated that there are 5000 transsexual people in the
United Kingdom.462 If ten percent of them brought legal challenges in the face
of continuing inaction to remedy human rights breaches, and if each were
ultimately awarded costs in the same amount as the ECHR has ordered the
U.K. government to pay Christine Goodwin (£28,800), the total costs would
amount to £14.4 million.4 63 This figure does not include the cost to the
Government of defending such cases.4" Thus the option of doing nothing to
rectify the United Kingdom's incompatibility with the Convention was not a
viable one.465
This left two options: a remedial order issued by government Ministers (as
authorized by Schedule 2 of the HRA) amending section 11(c) of the
Matrimonial Cause Act 1973 to enable transsexual people to marry in their
acquired gender,466 or legislation to address full legal recognition for
transsexual people's acquired gender.467 The government opted for compre-
hensive legislation, rather than a remedial order which would amend the
Matrimonial Cause Act 1973 but leave other concerns unresolved.468
Recognition Bill (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter Introduction GRB], http://www.dca.gov.uk/
constitution/transsex/intro.htm.
459 Id.
41 U.K. Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, Final Regulatory Impact Assessment: Gender
Recognition Bill (Nov. 2003), http://www.dca.gov/uk/risk/grbria.htm.
461 id.
462 id.
463 id.
464 id.
465 See id.
466 id.
467 id.
6 Id. In light of the ECJ decision in KB. two months later, this was evidently a wise choice.
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The Gender Recognition Bill was passed by the House of Lords on
February 10, 2004.469 The Bill passed the House of Commons with technical
amendments in late May 2004.470 The House of Lords accepted those
amendments in June 2004. 4"' On July 1, 2004, two years after the Goodwin
decision, Her Royal Highness Elizabeth H gave her Royal Assent to the Bill,
thereby making it the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA). 4 2
The text of the GRA is fascinating both for what it says and what it fails to
say. At the core of the Act is the ability of an adult (at least eighteen years of
age) to apply for a "gender recognition certificate" on the basis of "(a) living
in the other gender, or (b) having changed gender under the law of a country
or territory outside the United Kingdom." '473
Each application is to be determined by a Gender Recognition Panel which
must have at least one legal member and one medical member (either a
registered medical practitioner or a chartered psychologist).474 An application
based on the individual's living in the other gender must be granted if the
applicant-
(a) has or has had gender dysphoria,
(b) has lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two
years ending with the date on which the application is made,
(c) intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death,
and
(d) complies with [certain evidentiary] requirements.47 5
The evidence required to prove "living in another gender" is set forth as
follows:
(1) An application under section I (1)(a) must include either-
(a) a report made by a registered medical practitioner practis-
ing in the field of gender dysphoria and a report made by
469 U.K. Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, People's Rights: Transsexual People: Legislation,
http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitutiontranssexlegs.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
470 id.
471 Id.
472 Id.
473 Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7, § 1(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter GRA], available at http://
www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040007.htm.
474 Id. § 1(3), sched. 1, T 1(2).
475 Id. § 2(1).
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another registered medical practitioner (who may, but need
not, practise in that field), or
(b) a report made by a chartered psychologist practising in that
field and a report made by a registered medical practitioner
(who may, but need not, practise in that field).
(2)But subsection (1) is not complied with unless a report
required by that subsection and made by-
(a) a registered medical practitioner, or
(b) a chartered psychologist,
practising in the field of gender dysphoria includes details
of the diagnosis of the applicant's gender dysphoria.
(3) And subsection (1) is not complied with in a case where-
(a) the applicant has undergone or is undergoing treatment for
the purpose of modifying sexual characteristics, or
(b) treatment for that purpose has been prescribed or planned
for the applicant,
unless at least one of the reports required by that subsection
includes details of it.
(4)An application under section l(l)(a) must also include a
statutory declaration by the applicant that the applicant meets
the conditions in section 2(1)(b) and (c).
(6) Any application under section 1(1) must include-
(a) a statutory declaration as to whether or not the applicant is
married,
(b) any other information or evidence required by an order
made by the Secretary of State, and
(c) any other information or evidence which the Panel which
is to determine the application may require,
and may include any other information or evidence which the
applicant wishes to include." 6
Noticeably absent is any requirement of any specific type or quantum of
treatment. Specifically, there is no requirement that the applicant have
undergone hormonal treatment of any type or duration, nor that the applicant
have had any gender reassignment surgery. In this regard, the GRA goes well
beyond the mandate of the ECHR in Goodwin which referred specifically to
476 Id. § 3.
[Vol. 33:333
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GENDER CHANGE
"post-operative transsexuals." 4" Nor, unlike, for example, Germany,478 is there
a requirement that the applicant be sterile. The Parliamentary Bill Manager,
Dr. Emran Mian, has informed the author that the U.K. government has no
intention of drafting either subordinate legislation or regulations spelling out
more specific substantive requirements, but rather will leave the specifics for
the Gender Recognition Panels to determine on a case-by-case basis.479
If the Gender Recognition Panel grants the application of a person "living
in the other gender," it must issue that person a "gender recognition certifi-
cate."48 If the applicant is not married, the certificate is to be a "full" gender
recognition certificate.48" ' If, however, the applicant is married, the certificate
is an "interim" gender recognition certificate.482
An interim gender recognition certificate allows its recipient to apply,
within six months of its issuance, for a decree of nullity of marriage on the
grounds that the marriage is voidable.483 Upon issuing the nullity decree, the
court "must" also issue the applicant a full gender recognition certificate and
send a copy to the Secretary of State.484 Alternatively, if, within six months of
the issuance of an interim gender recognition certificate, the applicant's
marriage is dissolved or annulled on another ground or the applicant's spouse
dies, the applicant may then apply to the Gender Recognition Panel for a full
gender recognition certificate.485
An applicant whose application is rejected by a Gender Recognition Panel
may appeal on a point of law to the High Court or the Court of Session.486
... See supra text accompanying note 399.
478 See supra text accompanying note 329.
419 Telephone conversation with Dr. Emran Mian, Mar. 23, 2004. As of December 2004, the
Department for Constitutional Affairs is undergoing consultations on secondary legislation, not
on the substantive issue of the requirements for gender recognition, but rather on: approved
countries and territories, fees, and exceptions to the offense of disclosure. See U.K. Dep't for
Constitutional Affairs, People's Rights: Transsexual People: Publications, Consultation on
Secondary Legislation, http://www.dca.gov/uk/constitution/transsex/pubs.htm (last visited Mar.
3, 2005) (providing three consultation papers regarding these requirements under the Gender
Recognition Act).
480 GRA, supra note 473, § 4(1).
481 Id. § 4(2).
482 Id. § 4(3).
483 Id. sched. 2. In Scotland, this would be grounds for divorce rather than nullity. Id. §
5(1)(B).
414 Id. § 5(1).
485 Id. § 5(2).
486 Id. § 8.
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The general effect of a full gender recognition certificate is as follows:
(1)Where a full gender recognition certificate is issued to a
person, the person's gender becomes for all purposes the
acquired gender (so that, if the acquired gender is the male
gender, the person's sex becomes that of a man and, if it is the
female gender, the person's sex becomes that of a woman).
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect things done, or events occur-
ring, before the certificate is issued; but it does operate for the
interpretation of enactments passed, and instruments and other
documents made, before the certificate is issued (as well as
those passed or made afterwards).487
If the individual who receives a full gender recognition certificate has a
U.K. birth register entry, the Secretary of State must send a copy of the
certificate to the appropriate Registrar General.488 Schedule 3 contains detailed
provisions for the registrar general to maintain a Gender Recognition Register,
provide cross-referencing to the original registration index, and issue new short
certificates which do not reveal that there has been a change of gender.489
Although the individual who has received a full gender recognition
certificate is then deemed to have legally acquired the new gender for purposes
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, no member of the clergy is obliged to
solemnize the marriage of such a person.4 90 However, there is no such
exemption in relation to Register Offices.49'
The significance of allowing clergy in the Churches of England and Wales
to refuse to perform such marriages is that they would otherwise be under a
legal obligation to do so.492 Some clergy would find this offensive. The
Bishop of Winchester, Michael Scott-Joynt, has stated that such a marriage
487 Id. § 9(1), (2). Note the interchangeable use of the terms "gender" and "sex."
488 id. § 10.
489 Id. sched. 3.
490 Id. sched. 4, 3.
"' See U.K. Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, Gender Recognition Act-Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/ transexlfaq.htm (rev. July 2004) [hereinafter
GRA FAQ].
492 U.K. Parliament, Gender Recognition Bill [HL] Explanatory Notes, 4 1, http:/Iwww.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ID200304/l dbills/004/en/04004x--.htm (last visited Mar. 3,2005)
[hereinafter Explanatory Notes].
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would constitute a same-sex marriage. 93 However, after over three decades
of taking the position that a post-operative transsexual person maintains his
original gender and thus cannot marry someone of that gender because that
would be tantamount to same-sex marriage, the U.K. government is now taking
pains to articulate the opposite point of view. In its answers to Frequently
Asked Questions, the Department for Constitutional Affairs explains:
Does enabling transsexual people to marry in their acquired
gender amount to sanctioning same-sex marriage?
No, UK law allows marriage between a male and a female. If, for
example, someone registered as male at birth is later legally
recognised as being a woman, and then marries a man, that is not
a same-sex marriage. Marriages contracted by transsexual people
once their change of gender has been legally recognised will be
valid marriages between a male and a female-not same-sex.
The Government has no plans to introduce same-sex marriage.494
The GRA contains provisions that are intended to allow one party to a
marriage to seek an annulment if that party was unaware at the time of the
marriage that the other party "had become the acquired gender," i.e., was not
originally of the opposite sex.495 Again, the Department of Constitutional
Affairs has explained:
This is not in any way to imply that it is not perfectly in order for
transsexual people to marry in their acquired gender, once they
have that gender legally recognised. It is, however, the sort of
issue one would expect people to reveal to a prospective spouse
and where that has not happened and the spouse feels unable to
come to terms with it, the Bill provides for them to bring their
marriage to an end.496
Interestingly, acquisition of a new legal gender does not affect whether the
individual is the mother or father of pre-existing children: "The fact that a
... See Christopher Morgan, Church Weddings for Sex Swappers, SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 29,
2004, at 1-3.
414 See GRA FAQ, supra note 491. The United Kingdom is, however, proposing a same-sex
civil partnership registration scheme. Id.
495 GRA, supra note 473, sched. 4, 4-6.
496 See GRA FAQ, supra note 491.
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person's gender has become the acquired gender under this Act does not affect
the status of the person as the father or mother of a child. '497 The official
rationale for this provision is that, "The continuity of parental rights and
responsibilities is thus ensured. ' 498 Thus, for example, if Christine Goodwin
were to obtain a gender recognition certificate giving her the legal status of a
female, she would nevertheless remain the legal father of her four children.499
Conversely, X, who was born female and had female-to-male reassignment
surgery before his female partner was artificially inseminated, would
presumably be recognized as Z's father if he obtained a gender recognition
certificate." °
The GRA contains quite detailed, technical provisions regarding various
pension schemes, the essence of which is to treat those who have obtained a
gender recognition certificate as being of the acquired gender for pension
purposes where a pension scheme treats males and females differently.'s°
These provisions would address prospectively a situation of the sort raised by
Christine Goodwin that, because she was deemed to be male, she was not
eligible for her state pension at age sixty and had to continue to pay into the
pension fund until age sixty-five, the age of eligibility for males."°2 The NIHS
Pension issue raised by K.B. in the European Court of Justice0 3 will be able
to be resolved after passage of the GRA: K.B. can have her partner, R., obtain
a gender recognition certificate so that the couple can then get married.
The GRA amends the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis that an individual "has become the acquired gender." 5°4 This
expands existing protections for transsexual people in employment and
vocational training contained in regulations adopted in 1999.505 However, until
the transsexual person actually obtains a gender recognition certificate, an
employer may be able to demonstrate that a specific job requires a person born
into the required gender for that job.5"6
'9' GRA, supra note 473, § 12.
498 Explanatory Notes, supra note 492, 43.
'9 See supra text accompanying note 366.
500 See supra text accompanying notes 175-84.
'0 GRA, supra note 473, sched. 5,91 13; see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 492, [144-
78.
502 See supra text accompanying note 374. Since Goodwin was born in 1937, the GRA
provisions presumably will not affect her pension rights. See supra text accompanying note 365.
503 See supra text accompanying notes 439-41.
s GRA, supra note 473, § 14, sched. 6.
5 Explanatory Notes, supra note 492, 1 80.
506 id.
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The GRA also addresses the contentious issue of participation in competi-
tive sports." 7 This issue was brought to the fore a quarter century ago when
Renee Richards-who, as Richard Raskind, had been ranked thirteenth
nationally in men's thirty-five-and-older tennis-successfully sued the U.S.
Tennis Association for the right to compete in the women's division. °8 A
body responsible for regulating a "gender-affected sport" may restrict or
prohibit persons whose gender has become the acquired gender under certain
circumstances. A "gender-affected sport" is one where "the physical strength,
stamina or physique of average persons of one gender would put them at a
disadvantage to average persons of the other gender as competitors in events
involving the sport."509 Participation by a person of the acquired gender may
be restricted or prohibited if necessary to secure either fair competition or the
safety of competitors." 0
The GRA would not change the result in Regina v. Tan.51 In construing a
"gender specific (criminal) offence" (i.e., one where the crime involves sexual
activity and is dependent on the gender of either the perpetrator or the victim),
the fact that a person has become the acquired gender will not prevent a
prosecution as if the person had not changed genders." 2 Thus, Gloria Greaves
(born male) could still be prosecuted as a male prostitute, and Brian Greaves
could still be prosecuted for living off the earnings of a male prostitute (Gloria)
even if Gloria had obtained a gender recognition certificate recognizing her as
female.
The final provision of the primary legislation addresses persons who have
had a legal change of gender outside the United Kingdom. 513 The United
Kingdom will not regard such persons as having changed gender based solely
on a foreign order.514 Thus, such persons will not be deemed legally married
in the United Kingdom by reason of having entered into a foreign post-
recognition marriage. 5 However, their marriages will become valid in the
United Kingdom if they obtain full gender recognition certificates in the
507 GRA, supra note 473, § 19.
... Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
0 GRA, supra note 473, § 19(4).
510 Id. § 19(2).
511 See supra text accompanying notes 66-78.
512 GRA, supra note 473, § 20.
513 Id. § 21.
114 Id. § 21(1).
515 Id. § 21(2).
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United Kingdom (and have not entered into a later, valid marriage in the
meantime).51 6
XII. THE UNSETTLED AND UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF AMERICAN LAW
In its November 2003 Introduction and Background to the Gender
Recognition Bill, the U.K. Department for Constitutional Affairs states: "There
is no single common approach in other countries to the transsexual condition
and the complex issues it raises. However, all other EU Member States except
Ireland already give legal recognition to gender change, as do many other
countries in Europe and the Commonwealth and many American States." '517
The source for the claim about the United States was a briefing paper prepared
by Press for Change.5" The briefing paper, entitled Notes on International
Policy on Transsexual People, contains the following pertinent assertions:
USA
- All but two states have some provisions that allow the
amendment or a new birth certificate or birth record to be
issued
- Tennessee and Ohio are two exceptions where no alteration
to birth certificates are [sic] allowed
- Process and procedure of gender change varies (sic) between
states
PENNSYLVANIA
- Must have reassignment surgery
- Has petitioned the county court for name change
May also petition the Department of Health, Division of
[V]ital [R]ecords, to change birth record
- Evidence Medical Affidavit stating irreversible surgery
- Court ordered name change
-Vital [R]ecord [sic] will issue new certificate stating new
name and gender only
516 Id. § 21(4).
517 Introduction GRB, supra note 458; see also GRA FAQ, supra note 491.
518 Press for Change, Notes on International Policy on Transsexual People (2003) (on file
with author).
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- Will not be apparent that gender reassignment has taken place
MISSISSIPPI
- Will amend birth record by striking through name and sex and
annotating the new name and gender and effective date
- Will issue photostatic copy of birth record including hand
written amendments in miniature for (sic) as a birth certificate
All following states issue new birth certificate on production of
certificate from surgeon that carried out reassignment surgery
ILLINOIS
NEW JERSEY
ALABAMA
HAWAII
MARYLAND
NORTH CAROLINA
PENNSYLVANIA
VIRGINIA
In all other states an amended birth certificate will be issued
showing the sex has changed[ ]
The driving licence is the most common form of identification in
the States.
It is issued by the Department of Public Safety in each state
It show's (sic) name and sex
Change of name is easy through a name permit
Gender indication, until recently, could not be changed.1 9
To the extent that the DCA' s Introduction and Background to the GRB and
the Press for Change briefing paper on which it is based imply that many or
most American states would allow transsexual persons to remarry in their
acquired gender, they are misleading.
Many U.S. states may indeed permit post-operative transsexual persons to
acquire an amended birth certificate indicating their new gender; however, the
519 Id.
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unsupported claim that all but two states do so is certainly questionable. 2° For
example, although the Pennsylvania Department of Health Division of Vital
Records has no pertinent regulations, it does have a process for issuance of a
new birth certificate.52' When an individual inquires about obtaining a revised
birth certificate, the Division of Vital Records' Birth Correction Unit sends out
a form letter stating:
We are in receipt of your letter asking for information
concerning our policy for sex reassignment surgery. The sex
reassignment policy in the State of Pennsylvania is in keeping
with the U.S. Department of State policy concerning passports.
The change that you are requesting is composed of two
separate procedures. First, you must submit a certified copy of
a Court Order change of name. The Court Order must bear the
signature of the judge and the raised seal of the court.
Secondly, a surgical procedure is necessary to change the sex
designation listed on your birth record. After you have accom-
plished this, please submit a statement from the physician who
performed the sex reassignment surgery. The doctor's statement
must specify that the sex reassignment is successfully completed,
and that you are fully functioning within the newly assigned
gender.
If the Court Order (which) changes your name also includes
a directive to Vital Records [tp] change the sex designation, you
may disregard the procedure which requires a Dr's statement.
We are holding your certified copy and/or fee in our files pending
your reply.522
520 In his exhaustive 809-page slip opinion decision in In re Marriage of Kantaras, Judge
Gerrard O'Brien found, "There are fifteen (15) states that by law or administrative regulation
permit such an amendment." In re Marriage of Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, slip op. at 763 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 2002), rev'd on other grounds 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
521 See 28 PA. CODE § 1.3 (2004).
522 Letter from Pennsylvania Department of Health, Division of Vital Records (sample letter
on file with author). See also In re Dickinson, 4 Pa. D. & C.3d 678 (1978), in which the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia opined that if the post-operative male-to-female transsexual
had been born in Pennsylvania it would have ordered her birth certificate to be changed to show
the female sex; as she was born in Indiana, the court "requested" the Indiana State Board of
Health to change the name and sex on her birth record. Id. at 680-81.
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While it is certainly possible that many post-operative transsexual people
in the United States, whether or not they have obtained new birth certificates,
have gotten married in their acquired gender, it does not follow that their
marriages would be found valid if challenged. Just as Mrs. Bellinger obtained
a marriage certificate as a woman and married a man, only to be told by the
U.K. courts decades later that her marriage was void, so Americans entering
into marriages in similar circumstances may find those marriages declared
invalid years after the wedding ceremony and even after the death of one of the
spouses. The reported case law is scant, and it is mixed, although generally
following the Corbett view.
In M.T. v. J.T. in 1976, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, found valid a marriage between a man and a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual who had had her birth certificate changed by the State of
New York, where the marriage occurred.523 The New Jersey court expressly
rejected Judge Orrod's rationale in Corbett.24 The court did not explicitly
rely on M.T.'s amended New York birth certificate, but rather simply
concluded:
In this case the transsexual's gender and genitalia are no
longer discordant; they have been harmonized through medical
treatment. Plaintiff has become physically and psychologically
unified and fully capable of sexual activity consistent with her
reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy. Conse-
quently, plaintiff should be considered a member of the female
sex for marital purposes. It follows that such an individual would
have the capacity to enter into a valid marriage relationship with
a person of the opposite sex and did do so here. In so ruling we
do no more than give legal effect to a Fait accompli, based upon
medical judgment and action which are irreversible. Such
recognition will promote the individual's quest for inner peace
and personal happiness, while in no way disserving any societal
interest, principle of public order or precept of morality.525
The decision in M.T. nevertheless has not gained general acceptance in the
United States.
523 M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
524 Id. at 208-09.
525 Id. at 211.
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In 1987, in In re Ladrach, the Probate Court of Stark County, Ohio, refused
to authorize a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to have her birth
certificate "corrected" to indicate her sex as female, and further refused to
issue her a marriage license to marry a male.526 With regard to the right to
marry, the Ohio court cited both M.T. and Corbett, and found the latter
"particularly important because of the reasoning of Judge Ormrod, who was
also a medical doctor." '527 The court found no authority in Ohio law to issue
a marriage license for the applicant to marry a male.5" 8
In 1999, in Littleton v. Prange, an appellate court in Texas refused to
recognize a marriage that took place in Kentucky between a man and a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual who had obtained a legal name change.529
After her husband died, Christie Littleton filed a medical malpractice action
under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statute.530 The defendant doctor
successfully asserted that the plaintiff lacked standing because she was not a
lawful surviving spouse.5 31 "During the pendency of [the] lawsuit, Christie
amended the original birth certificate to change the sex and name."
532
Nevertheless, following Corbett, the Texas court found that Christie legally
remained a male: "The facts contained in the original birth certificate were true
and accurate, and the words contained in the amended certificate are not
binding on this court. There are some things we cannot will into being. They
just are. 533
In 2002, in In re Estate of Gardiner, the Kansas Supreme Court declared
invalid a marriage between a male and a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual.534 The wife, J'Noel, had obtained an amended birth certificate in
Wisconsin, pursuant to Wisconsin statutes, to state that she was female.535 She
had argued in the trial court that the Wisconsin court order directing the
issuance of the amended birth certificate was entitled to full faith and credit in
52 In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. Stark County 1987).
527 Id. at 832.
528 Id.
529 Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
530 Id. at 225.
531 id.
532 Id. at 231.
533 id.
" In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
131 Id. at 125-26.
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Kansas.536 On appeal, J'Noel argued that her marriage was valid under Kansas
law. Construing the Kansas marriage statute, the Court held:
The words "sex," "male," and "female" in everyday under-
standing do not encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary
meaning of "persons of the opposite sex" contemplates a
biological man and a biological woman and not persons who are
experiencing gender dysphoria. A male-to-female post-operative
transsexual does not fit the definition of a female. The male
organs have been removed, but the ability to "produce ova and
bear offspring" does not and never did exist. There is no womb,
cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes.
As the Littleton court noted, the transsexual still "inhabits ... a
male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have
supplied." J'Noel does not fit the common meaning of female. 7
In 2003, in In re Marriage License for Nash, an Ohio appellate court
affirmed the denial of a marriage license to a female and post-operative
female-to-male transsexual.5 38 The transsexual, Jacob B. Nash, had obtained
an amended birth certificate from Massachusetts in 2002 "with a designation
as a male." '539 On the parties' first application for a marriage license, they
failed to declare Nash's former marriage to a male, which had ended in
divorce. 4 ° When the trial court discovered the omission, it rejected the
application, finding Nash's explanation that the omission was a "mere
oversight" to lack credibility. 541 The parties filed a second application for a
marriage license properly disclosing Nash's previous marriage.5 42 The trial
court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on this application, but on the advice
of counsel, "Nash refused to answer any questions pertaining to Nash's sex
reassignment surgeries." '543 The trial court rejected the second application,
finding that Nash's refusal to permit the court to make reasonable inquiry
536 Id.
... Id. at 135 (citation omitted).
"' In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6513, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
539 Id. at *2.
540 Id. at *3.
541 Id.
542 Id. at *4.
543 id.
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prevented the court from determining if the requirements for a marriage license
had been met.544
On appeal, the applicants argued, first, that they had been denied equal
protection because they were held to a higher evidentiary standard than were
other applicants and, second, that the Ohio courts were bound to give full faith
and credit to Nash's corrected Massachusetts birth certificate.145 The appeals
court readily disposed of the equal protection issue:
Moreover, in the face of the evidence before the court, the court
was not only permitted to require additional information from
Nash, as well as conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter, it
was required to do what was necessary to insure that the issuance
of the marriage license was proper and valid. In other words, this
case was not the usual case and the court was required to treat
this case accordingly. In doing so, the applicants' equal protec-
tion rights were not violated. 46
With regard to the full faith and credit argument, the court noted that the
amended Massachusetts birth certificate would, under Massachusetts law, only
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts recorded, not conclusive proof.547
It was rebutted by the evidence in Nash's original birth certificate that Nash
was born female.548 Following In re Estate of Gardiner, Lin re Ladrach, and
Littleton, the court found Nash to be biologically a female and thus not eligible
under Ohio law and public policy to marry another female.549
Most recently, in July 2004, in Kantaras v. Kantaras, an appellate court in
Florida reversed a trial court and declared void ab initio a marriage between
a female and a female-to-male transsexual.55 The husband, Michael, had been
born a female and underwent gender reassignment surgery in 1987.55- He met
his future wife, Linda, in 1988, and she learned of his gender reassignment.552
54 id.
141 Id. at *6.
'4 Id. at *10.
147 Id. at *12.
541 Id. at *13.
541 Id. at *16-*25. Judge Judith A. Christley dissented. Id. at *29-*34.
550 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
551 Id.
552 id.
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Linda gave birth to a son by a former boyfriend in June 1989.Y The parties
married in July 1989."' 4 On the marriage license, Michael represented that he
was a male. 5" Linda had a daughter in 1992 through artificial insemination.556
In 1998, Michael filed for divorce and custody.557 Linda counterclaimed for
annulment, asserting that the marriage was void ab initio, that Michael's
adoption of her son violated Florida's ban on homosexual adoption, and that
Michael was not the biological or legal father of her daughter.558 Reversing the
trial court, the Florida court of appeal concluded:
The controlling issue in this case is whether, as a matter of law,
the Florida statutes governing marriage authorize a postoperative
transsexual to marry in the reassigned sex. We conclude they do
not. We agree with the Kansas, Ohio, and Texas courts in their
understanding of the common meaning of male and female, as
those terms are used statutorily, to refer to immutable traits
determined at birth. Therefore, we also conclude that the trial
court erred by declaring that Michael is male for the purpose of
the marriage statutes. 9
Thus, ironically, American law has evolved in the exact opposite direction
from the law of the European Court of Human Rights. After the M.T. decision
by the Superior Court of New Jersey in 1976 recognized the validity of a
marriage of a transsexual in her acquired gender, no final, appellate American
case has followed suit. 56° To the contrary, the courts in In re Ladrach,
Littleton, In re Estate of Gardiner, In re Marriage License, and Kantaras have
all denied such a right.56'
553 Id.
154 Id. at 155-56.
551 Id. at 155.
556 Id. at 156.
557 Id.
558 id.
... 1d. at 157. The court remanded for further consideration of the custody issues. Id. at 161.
" At least one unreported trial level decision has found a valid marriage under these
circumstances. See ACLU News 11-26-97, CA Court Rules Transgendered Dad is Male;
Custody Case Will Proceed to Trial (Nov. 26, 1997) (ACLU Newsfeed bulk e-mail), http://
legalminds.lp.findlaw.comlist/news/msgOO002.html.
561 Most recently, in February 2005, an appellate court in Illinois found invalid a marriage
between a female and a female-to-male transsexual. In re Marriage of Simmons, Nos. 1-03-
2284, 1-03-2348 (consolidated), 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 127. The husband had obtained a
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XI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The issue of the legal treatment of transsexual persons is a serious matter
of both process and substance. The process by which the United Kingdom has
moved from non-recognition of acquired gender, starting with Corbett in 1970,
to enactment of the Gender Recognition Act in 2004, has been a long and
complicated one. Few legal professionals or academics, much less the general
public, could have foreseen that passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 would
ultimately lead to a domestic legal requirement in the United Kingdom to
recognize transsexual people's acquired gender. As of November 1998, when
the HRA received royal assent, the European Court of Human Rights had
upheld the United Kingdom's refusal to recognize acquired gender four times:
Rees (1986), Cossey (1990), X, Y and Z (1997), and Sheffield and Horsham
(July 1998). When the ECHR reversed course in 2002 with Goodwin and .,
the HRA mandated compliance.
The Bellinger decision in the House of Lords may appear frustrating and
puzzling, especially to American-trained lawyers. The Law Lords in essence
ruled that the Bellingers were not legally married, although they had a right to
be. Nevertheless, on a matter so laden with public policy implications, there
is a clear value to the sort of deliberative, legislative process in which the U.K.
government ultimately engaged, with the involvement of a well-respected
working group providing study and analysis.
The appellate courts in the United States that have rejected acquired gender
recognition in the marital context have uniformly noted that any change must
come from the legislature.5 62 The argument can certainly be made that denying
marriage license as a male. Prior to the wedding the husband had taken testosterone for several
years. Six years into the marriage, he underwent a hysterectomy and a bilateral salpingo
oophorectomy, and subsequently obtained a new birth certificate as a male. However, he never
had additional available surgeries in order to be medically considered completely sexually
reassigned. Given these facts, the trial court simply found that he remained a female. The
appellate court concluded that the judgment of the trial court was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Accordingly it had no occasion to address the American and other precedents
involving transsexual persons who have completed sexual reassignment.
562 "[I]t is this court's opinion that the legislature should change the statutes, if it is to be the
public policy of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post-operative transsexuals." In re Ladrach,
513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. Stark County 1987). "In our system of government it is
for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of marriages involving transsexuals." Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex.
App. 1999). "[The validity of J'Noel's marriage to Marshall is a question of public policy to
be addressed by the legislature and not by this court." In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 137
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a post-operative transsexual person the right to marry in the acquired gender
is a violation of the (limited) constitutional right to marry and thus should
simply be struck down by American courts as were the miscegenation laws in
Lovingi 63 Nevertheless the U.K. Gender Recognition Act demonstrates that
difficult questions would remain as to where along the continuum of treatment
the law should recognize gender change.
It appears that the United Kingdom has chosen in effect to gloss over this
critical issue in the GRA by not requiring any specific type or amount of
treatment, but rather leaving individual decisions up to gender recognition
panels with little specific guidance, and limited grounds for appeal. Such an
approach might well be unworkable in the United States and contrary to
American fundamental notions of due process. Absent clear standards there
could be widely disparate results. One gender recognition panel could deny
acquired gender recognition where in identical circumstances another panel
might grant it. The notion that no specific hormonal or surgical treatment is
required could, theoretically at least, lead to a homosexual transvestite being
authorized to be legally deemed to have changed gender despite retaining the
body of a person of the original gender.56 The lack of specific requirements
to guide the implementing panels could also run afoul of the nondelegation
doctrine.565
Obviously, if individual states decide to permit marriage between any two
unmarried adults, without regard to their gender, who are not barred by
consanguinity or otherwise, 66 and the U.S. Constitution is not amended to bar
(Kan. 2002). "[T]his would start us down the slippery slope to judicially legislating same-sex
marriages, an area within the purview of the legislature alone." In re Marriage License for Nash,
Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6513, at *18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
Whether advances in medical science support a change in the meaning
commonly attributed to the terms male and female as they are used in the
Florida marriage statutes is a question for the legislature. Thus, the question
of whether a post-operative transsexual is authorized to marry a member of
their birth sex is a matter for the Florida legislature and not the Florida courts
to decide.
Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 161.
3 388 U.S. 1.
56 See LEWIS CARRoti, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (AND WHAT AUCE FOUND THERE)
124 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1984) (1872) (' 'When I use a word,' " Humpty Dumpty said, in
rather a scornful tone," 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'
565 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001).
566 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); it re
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
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such marriages, 567 the central issue raised in Cossey would be eliminated in
those states at the state level. Difficult marriage issues would remain,
however. Would such a marriage be recognized in other states? Would the
federal government recognize such a marriage for Social Security, federal tax,
or a variety of other federal purposes, or would it refuse under the Defense of
Marriage Act?568 And, some of the secondary issues addressed in the GRA,
such as sports participation, would also remain.
It may be too much to expect that many, if any, American jurisdictions
could engage in the sort of deliberative legislative process undertaken by the
United Kingdom leading up to enactment of the GRA, generally free of rancor,
sound bites, and hysterical condemnations of those advocating diverse points
of view. But it is high time that this process began. The insistence on
chromosomes trumping all other considerations for gender identification for
purposes of marriage is simply cruel. As eloquently expressed by Judge
Martens, dissenting in Cossey:
I think that these indeed are the essential points. The principle
which is basic in human rights and which underlies the various
specific rights spelled out in the Convention is respect for human
dignity and human freedom. Human dignity and human freedom
imply that a man should be free to shape himself and his fate in
the way that he deems best fits his personality. A transsexual
does use those very fundamental rights. He is prepared to shape
himself and his fate. In doing so he goes through long, dangerous
and painful medical treatment to have his sexual organs, as far as
is humanly feasible, adapted to the sex he is convinced he
belongs to. After these ordeals, as a post-operative transsexual,
he turns to the law and asks it to recognise the fait accompli he
has created. He demands to be recognised and to be treated by
the law as a member of the sex he has won; he demands to be
treated, without discrimination, on the same footing as all other
females, or, as the case may be, males. This is a request which
the law should refuse to grant only if it truly has compelling
567 Bush Calls for Ban on Same-Sex Marriages, Feb. 25, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/
ALLPOLITICS/02/24/elecO4.prez.bush.marriage.
568 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at I U.S.C. § 7
(2004) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004)).
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reasons, for.., such a refusal can only be qualified as cruel. But
there are no such reasons.569
Indeed, if one is genuinely opposed to same-sex marriage (an issue on
which this article has assiduously taken no position), barring post-operative
transsexual persons from marrying in their acquired gender can lead to
unpropitious results. If Mrs. Bellinger cannot marry Mr. Bellinger because the
law insists based on her chromosomes that she remains male, then it follows
that she, with female appearance including female breasts and a surgically
constructed vagina, can only marry a female! This is not a mere hypothetical
possibility. Consider the case of Michele Kammerer and Janis Walworth.57°
Kdimmerer was born male and had been married twice as a man, and was the
father of two children. Kammerer transitioned (started living full-time as a
woman) in 1991. Kammerer met Walworth (a female from birth) a few years
later at a gathering for post-operative transsexual women. Wearing "an
embroidered skirt with the little bells on the waist" and, looking "undoubtedly
feminine," Michele Kaimmerer married Janis Walworth in London. Because
of the United Kingdom's insistence prior to passage of the GRA in July 2004
that a male-to-female transsexual person remains male, the marriage was a
perfectly legal, heterosexual marriage.
For the same reason, Utah was compelled to allow the marriage of Nicole
(a male-to-female transsexual) and Marlene Cline."'
While it does not appear that there is any reported American case on the
legality of a post-operative transsexual marrying a person of his or her post-
operative gender, the reasoning of In re Ladrach, Littleton, In re Estate of
Gardiner, In re Marriage License for Nash and Kantaras surely would compel
a result that such unions would be heterosexual and lawful.
Unless those people who find homosexuality to be abhorrent wish the law
to sanction such unions, which to all intents and purposes and to all appear-
ances are homosexual in nature, then-if for no humanitarian reason-it is
time for American legislatures to realize that there are many transsexual
persons in this country and to address their legal status as Great Britain has
finally done. Likewise, for humanitarian reasons, the time has come for
American legislatures to follow Britain's lead and study and address the
569 Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, 648 (1990)
(Martens J., dissenting).
570 Chris Beam, For Better or For Worse?, 8 OuT 60, 60-61 (May 2000).
See id. at 65.
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marital rights of post-operative transsexual persons in a reasoned and realistic
fashion.
